Lecture 1:  Human capital formation in Europe before industrialisation: institutions and practices


Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological Change in Preindustrial Europe

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This article argues that medieval craft guilds emerged in order to provide transferable skills through apprenticeship. They prospered for more than half a millennium because they sustained interregional specialized labor markets and contributed to technological invention by stimulating technical diffusion through migrant labor and by providing inventors with temporary monopoly rents. They played a leading role in preindustrial manufacture because their main competitor, rural putting out, was a net consumer rather than producer of technological innovation. They finally disappeared not through adaptive failure but because national states abolished them by decree.

Technological invention and innovation in the preindustrial economy are still poorly understood. This is partly because of the difficulty in identifying the small-scale and anonymous innovations that dominated technical progress at the time. However, the problem is compounded by several longstanding assumptions about premodern manufacture, in particular by the view that from the fifteenth century onwards craft guilds—which provided European urban manufacture with its main institutional framework for over 600 years—were organized rent-seekers that systematically opposed technical innovation.

This article suggests that the prevailing view of craft guilds misrepresents their principal function and their technological consequences. It begins by analyzing the guild structure from the point of view of individual producers and suggests that the primary purpose of craft guilds was to provide adequate skills training through formal apprenticeship. It then argues, from evidence of innovation and resistance to it, that technological invention and innovation were a significant, albeit mostly unintended effect of the crafts’ support for investment in skills. It concludes by briefly addressing the counterfactual question implied by the guilds’ critics: if craft guilds were technologically regressive, why was guild-based craft production not out-competed by its major contemporary rival, rural protoindustry?

Rather than provide a detailed study of an individual craft or of a constellation of guilds in one town, the focus will be on the broad outlines of a sys-

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tem that remained fundamentally unchanged for more than half a millen-
nium. A distinction is drawn between the general structure and purposes of
the manufacturing guild and individual guild practice under changing histor-
ical circumstances. The purpose of the distinction is twofold. First, it pro-
vides a set of parameters for the way craft guilds, markets in skilled labor,
and technological innovation interacted in premodern Europe. Second, it
draws attention to two aspects of guild behavior that are often confused.
These are, on the one hand, the technological spillovers of craft activities,
which were largely unintentional, unavoidable, and economically beneficial;
on the other hand, the crafts’ oligopolistic controls over output, which were
deliberate and had essentially negative effects, but were neither universal,
nor permanent, nor easily enforced. This article focuses on the former and
touches more briefly on the latter. It is concerned strictly with manufacturing
guilds; I do not discuss guilds associated with the service sector whose strat-
egies and effects may have been quite different.

WHAT WERE CRAFT GUILDS FOR?

The craft guild was a formal association of specialized artisans, the mas-
ters, whose authority was backed by superior political sanction; apprentices
and journeymen came under guild jurisdiction but lacked membership rights.
Economic explanations of the craft guild assume that it performed one or
more of the following functions: it acted as a cartel, both as buyer of raw
materials and as seller of its products; it enforced quality standards which
lowered asymmetries in information, particularly outside the local market-
place where the products were little known; it provided members with inter-
temporal transfers of income in highly unstable markets, smoothing the trade
cycle and removing the issue of compensation from the arena of partisan
politics, and it served as a bargaining unit in narrow markets in which agents
held market power; it supplied cheap credit in underdeveloped financial
markets with high information costs; it operated as a political and admin-
istrative unit that protected its members from expropriation by opportunistic
urban elites, who in exchange demanded that it collect capital tax and tie
apprentices so as to provide cities with a ready military force; or finally and

1 See Farr, “On the Shop Floor” for a recent defense of this approach. There were nonetheless
significant regional differences both in the number and in certain formal characteristics of the guilds.
For example, quality controls were particularly extensive in the Germanic world, where political
fragmentation gave a foreign trade orientation to much artisan output (Hickson and Thompson, “New
Theory,” p. 155). On the other hand, French and Spanish guilds were less pervasive and more loosely
organized (Turnau, “Organization,” pp. 586–95). Although I do not address such regional differences
systematically, the article shows how a meaningful regional typology of guilds can be constructed.

2 Manufacturing guilds were subject to far greater competitive pressures than guilds in the service
sector, which also appear to have been more litigious and protectionist; see Deceulaer, “Guilds,” for
early modern Antwerp.
most noxiously, it was a rent-seeking organization that lobbied for economic privilege from the state.³

None of these explanations alone seems to account wholly for the range and typology of premodern manufacturing guilds. The most pervasive view, according to which craft guilds were primarily rent-seeking institutions, takes their regulations at face value and assumes that they acted as monopolists in political markets. In fact, the powers of craft guilds were frequently illusory. In the first place, guild privileges were contingent upon competing political interests. This meant that privileged income streams could be revoked at any time, as Charles V’s abolition of the guilds’ political privileges in 27 German free imperial cities between 1548 and 1552 proved to good effect.⁴ Second, the interests of the more conservative small-scale craftsmen were generally at odds with those of the wealthier masters, and the guilds as a whole were often at odds with the merchant corporations, who were usually better represented in local government. Cumulatively, these rivalries undermined the more conservative smaller craftsmen’s concerns. Third, guilds in larger cities mostly lacked the powers and resources to effectively police their precincts. Fourth, the claim that craft guilds were primarily rent-seeking coalitions is belied by widespread evidence of craftsmen deliberately avoiding guild membership. I return to these points in more detail.

We must also ask whether some of the more positive functions credited to guilds could not have been exercised as well and more cheaply by other means. It is true that the guilds could help reduce asymmetries of information and promote sales through quality controls. However, in small-scale markets, less formal arrangements could be just as effective. Thus, the bazaar-like bunching together of shops in the same street that was one of the more salient features of urban manufacture in this period allowed local customers to compare wares and prices on the spot.⁵ Equally, where industries served foreign markets in which it was crucial to establish and uphold a reputation by signalling the product’s origin, those assurances could be provided just as effectively by city authorities or merchant associations, as the examples of late medieval Douai and Milan attest.⁶ Similarly, it was possible to smooth fluctuations in life-cycle income or provide members with cheap credit by means of other readily available institutions like religious fratern-

³ See Mickwitz, *Kartellfunktionen* (cartelization); Gustafsson, *Rise*; and Richardson, "Brand Names" (enforcement of quality standards); Persson, *Pre-Industrial Economic Growth* (bargaining and welfare functions); Pfister, "Craft Guilds" (credit provision); Hickson and Thompson, "New Theory" (administrative and fiscal functions); and Ogilvie, *State Corporatism* (rent seeking).
⁴ Friedrichs, *Early Modern City*, p. 56.
⁵ The suggestion below, note 66 that the agglomeration of crafts in the same location was a consequence of the development of an apprenticeship system implies that quality control emerged as an unforeseen benefit of clustering.
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ities, kinship networks, urban provisioning structures, “poor laws,” and the like. The comparative advantage of guilds in these respects is not immediately apparent.

Arguments based on the welfare-enhancing functions of guilds face the same difficulty that claims about rent-seeking do, which is to explain why craft guilds enforced compulsory membership to avoid free-riding by external beneficiaries of its activities. Since the externalities of cheap credit or improved average consumption were, if anything, negative, guilds whose main purpose was to provide these services should have been faced with an oversupply rather than a dearth of applicants. The view that guilds aimed to protect their members against capital expropriation raises similar objections.

Although it would be wrong to deny that craft guilds took on these capacities (including the distribution to members of politically determined rent streams), quality enforcement, credit provision, and welfare support seem insufficient reasons for the guilds to emerge and to survive for such an extraordinary length of time. Although those welfare-enhancing capacities increased greatly as early modern state regulation expanded, they are best understood as subsidiary “non-collective social benefits” which raised the cost for members of free-riding or of defecting with technical secrets. They helped the craftsmen as a group to retain their members’ skilled labor and to avoid the costs of dispersal: guilds sought rents if they were there for the taking, but they were not invented nor did they survive for that purpose.

The main objective of an individual master was to make the most efficient use of family and outside skilled labor in the workshop. Hence, relations with apprentices and journeymen who did not formally belong to the guild were just as important as those with the guild membership. The first hypothesis to be addressed is that, from the point of view of the individual artisan, the primary function of the craft association was to enforce contractual norms that reduced opportunism by masters and apprentices. Put somewhat differently, the main purpose of the craft guild was to share out the

7 Nonmembers of a group that aimed to provide cheap credit would have to pay higher interest rates because of information asymmetries. Moreover, if the guilds’ primary function (see below, note 10) was the provision of credit, one would expect to find guild density to be inversely correlated with the development of efficient credit markets; in fact, guilds emerged first in Italy where sophisticated credit markets were also the first to develop.

8 Hickson and Thompson, “New Theory.”

9 Olson, Logic, pp. 72–75.

10 The primary function is defined here as one that is both necessary and sufficient for guilds to emerge and survive over time. The earliest references to craft guilds invariably concern contracts of apprenticeship (Epstein, Wage Labor). Conversely, the decline of guild influence in late eighteenth-century England is strongly correlated with a rise in the number of incomplete apprenticeships (Snell, Annals, pp. 253–54; see also below, note 82). A mainly skills-enhancing function of guilds might also explain why female guilds were so unusual. Women were mostly restricted to activities learned informally at home and formally in female religious houses and orphanages; exceptions were granted to relatives of master craftsmen and journeymen (ibidem, chap.6; Hafter, European Women; and Farr, “On the Shop Floor”, pp. 42–47).
unattributed costs and benefits of training among its members. Guilds were cost sharing rather than price-fixing cartels.\textsuperscript{11}

**APPRENTICESHIP AND THE PROVISION OF SKILLS**

Ever since Adam Smith's attack on apprenticing laws as a means of restricting access to the labor market, the economics of preindustrial apprenticeship has been virtually ignored. Because the formal length of training that was imposed (which in Smith's England was for many crafts still seven years) seemed out of proportion to the requisite skills, its purpose could only be to exclude competition. Smith's argument that apprenticeship served to maintain a labor market monopsony seemed at first blush unassailable; since then, it has become akin to an article of faith.\textsuperscript{12}

The argument has both an epistemological and an institutional component. Smith's epistemological claim is that tacit, embodied skills which cannot be formulated explicitly or symbolically through the written or the spoken word can nonetheless be transmitted at virtually no cost. In modern terminology, Smith assumes that all skills are general. This clearly underestimates both the existence and complexity of specific or transferable skills in preindustrial crafts and the difficulties in transmitting expertise. The question to be addressed is not whether training in skills was costless or unnecessary (it was neither), but which institution could best overcome the three principal hurdles of technical transmission. These were how to teach skills; how to allocate costs to provide teachers and pupils with adequate incentives; and how to monitor the labor market to avoid major imbalances between supply and demand for skilled labor. In the absence in premodern societies of compulsory schooling and of efficient bureaucracies, the best available solution on all counts was arguably a system of training contracts enforced by specialized craft associations.\textsuperscript{13}

Smith's institutional critique of apprenticeship raises the objection that, although he implied that apprenticeship would only persist where corporations could enforce their laws strictly, there is strong evidence that informal

\textsuperscript{11} The guilds' general lack of concern with fixing price was probably due to the high enforcement costs involved; where price controls were applied, they established price maxima and quality minima rather than price minima and quality maxima (Hickson and Thompson, "New Theory"), possibly as a way of maximizing exports. Competition on price within the guild was therefore allowed.

\textsuperscript{12} Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, pp. 133, 136–37. However, the seven-year rule did not apply to any craft that arose after the Statute of Artificers was approved in 1563.

\textsuperscript{13} See Rothschild, "Adam Smith," pp. 13–15. Trainees needed to learn not only about a range of different production methods and technologies, but about markets, competitive standards, and negotiation with other artisans, laborers, and merchants. Even modern schooling provides insufficient instruction for learning a craft or profession, for the simple reason that it does not impart tacit skills in them. Thus machine tool producers, lawyers, doctors, and microbiologists must all undergo some kind of nonverbal craft-like training. On the cognitive difficulties of knowledge transmission, see Bloch, "Language." For transferable skills see below, note 25.
rules of apprenticeship applied also where craft guilds were not legally sanctioned.\(^{14}\) It is also the case that the combined vigilance of town authorities and merchant corporations, and competition between craft members and between separate crafts, made statutory restrictions on apprentice numbers easy to flout. The labor market was oligopsonistic rather than monopsonistic.\(^{15}\) Thus, more able apprentices could rise to journeyman status before their contract expired.\(^{16}\) Governments lifted guilds’ entry requirements if epidemics or other events reduced the supply of craftsmen.\(^{17}\) The significant differences in the length of apprenticeships between similar crafts suggest moreover that statutory length was an arbitrary and negotiable benchmark, set because the guilds were unable to legislate on the teaching itself.\(^{18}\) Even the apparently uncompromising norms of the Statute of Artificers of 1563 gave English J.P.s discretion in applying apprenticeship rules.\(^{19}\) Labor market restrictions were further weakened by town councils, which frequently allowed masters to practise without enrolling in the corporation and gave tacit approval to a vast number of skilled journeymen and de facto masters, “false workers” and women who set up business in the expanding town suburbs beyond guild jurisdiction. In Vienna in 1736 only 32 percent out of over 10,000 master artisans were enrolled in guilds.\(^{20}\)

14 Epstein, Wage Labor, pp. 77–78; Howell, “Achieving”; Gay Davies, Enforcement, pp. 1, 11, 125, 263–67; Sewell, Work, pp. 38–9; Sonenscher, Hatters, pp. 48–67; and Hudson, Genesis, p. 31. The existence of set-up costs established a minimum viable size for guilds, below which less specialized institutions (village or small town courts) or informal face-to-face arrangements could be expected to enforce implicit contracts. Para-guild structures such as fraternities arose where craft organizations were formally banned by the state and merchant associations were particularly powerful, as in fourteenth-century Milan (Mainoni, Economia, pp. 207–28) and late medieval Douai (Howell, “Achieving”). However, the question of what arrangements replaced guilds where these lacked political backing has still to be systematically examined.

15 Thus, the English Statute of Artificers did not restrict the number of apprentices that could be employed. In general, “guild officials and courts were not easily inclined to prosecute employers [who] flouted apprenticeship clauses” (Lis and Soly, “Irresistible Phalanx,” pp. 22–23, 41–42; also Swanson, Medieval Artisans, p. 114; and Lipson, Economic History, vol. 2, pp. 39–40). For flouting of restrictions on journeymen see Safley, “Production,” p. 129; and Farr, Hands, pp. 63–64. The association between apprenticeship and imperfectly competitive labor markets is demonstrated by Stevens, “Theoretical Model,” who shows how under such circumstances oligopsonistic structures may emerge from a competitive system of firms.

16 Epstein, Wage Labor, pp. 107, 109, 110.
17 See Heller, Labor, p. 96; Rapp, Industry, p. 20; and Berlin, “Broken,” p. 78.
19 Gay Davies, Enforcement, p. 2; and Degrassi, Economia, p. 53. The seven-year term set by the Statute of Apprentices codified the custom of London, but “its observance was primarily a matter of local custom” (Lipson, Economic History, vol. 3, p. 283).
The legal confusion underlying claims to “monopoly,” which caused friction over the demarcation of tasks, made the regulation of labor even harder. Whereas struggles to control new industrial processes are often decried for their coercive aspects and legal costs, they also expressed guild competition and widespread evasion of rules; similarly, the frequent wrangles when new crafts broke away from old undermined the parent craft’s control. In some cities, like Florence and London, crafts were grouped in huge “umbrella” denominations, which took the sting out of demarcation issues and made it easier for craftsmen to move between different sectors. Changes in craft descriptions brought about by periodic fissure, abolition and creation are further proof of their capacity to adapt to changing technical processes and tastes. Finally, members of the same household practicing different crafts also weakened the hold of guild jurisdiction. Generally speaking, urban labor markets were far more flexible than the letter of the law seems to allow.

Guild coercion was instead essential as a means of enforcing apprenticeship rules in the presence of training externalities in transferable skills. Before the introduction of mass schooling, a degree of formal training was needed to iron out initial differences in skills among children and to socialize adolescents into adulthood; artisans required skilled labor to produce goods to a standard quality and to raise output. Masters could reclaim their investment costs (which included time spent on training, wasted materials, and other costs). Guilds were able to enforce these rules through the use of apprenticeship contracts and other means.

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21 For a detailed study of guild conflicts in Antwerp over two centuries, see Deceulaer, “Guilds,” with extensive references.
22 In theory, demarcation conflicts could produce technological bottlenecks; in practice their effects are less clear cut. See Mokyr, “Innovation,” p. 21 fn. 48, citing Heller, Labor, pp. 95–96 for resistance by Parisian armourers to an innovation in military helmets, which was however overruled by Charles IX; see also below, note 43. In theory, demarcation conflicts were concentrated in the service sector; industrial and luxury crafts did little to regulate members or to exclude outsiders (Deceulaer, “Guilds,” pp. 191–95, 200 with references to similar conditions elsewhere in the southern Netherlands). Hirshler, “Medieval Economic Competition,” pp. 53–54, views conflict between guilds and guild separations as evidence of strong competition.
23 See Berlin, “Broken,” pp. 77–78, for the effects of some 27 new incorporations in London between 1600 and 1640. As the total number of craft descriptions in Dijon increased from 81 to 102 between 1464 and 1750, 67 new descriptions appeared and 45 vanished, presumably owing to technological innovation (Farr, “On the Shop Floor”, p. 34). In 1570 the cloth guilds in Amiens were reorganized in order to produce a cloth with the properties of both sayns and woolens (Heller, Labor, p. 120). By contrast, in 1726 the Amiens merchants blocked an attempt to consolidate two cloth guilds because they feared to lose the profits from brokering thread (Bossenga, “Protecting Merchants,” p. 701).
24 Swanson, Medieval Artisans, p. 117.
25 Transferable skills are neither entirely general (applicable across a competitive labor market) nor entirely specific to one firm, but are valued by a small group of oligopolistic firms, and require apprenticeship contracts to avoid poaching (Stevens, “Theoretical Model”). The oligopolistic structure of craft industry was the result of increasing returns to scale and, in particular, of gains from learning-by-doing, which lowered marginal costs over time as productivity per worker increased.
26 For socialization see Smith, “London Apprentices”; and Lipson, Economic History, vol. 1, pp. 313–14. Sabel and Zeitlin, “Historical Alternatives,” pp. 152–55, suggest that in areas with high concentrations of specific industries, most skills were acquired informally, but they also note the existence of formal apprenticeships.
and maintenance) by requiring that the apprentice work for below market wages after gaining a set level of skills. Conversely, in the absence of credible bans against apprentice opportunism which took the shape of early departure and of poaching by rival masters who could offer higher wages because they had no training costs to recover, training would have been less than optimal and would have constrained output. A lack of rules would also have reduced the masters’ incentives to develop their own talents. More highly skilled masters stood a better chance of attracting good apprentices at lower cost; the effort of teaching could also help develop the master’s talents.27 Guilds enforced compliance through statutory penalties backed up with a combination of compulsory membership, blackmailing and boycott.28

In order to restrain apprentices’ opportunism, masters also demanded rights over the apprentice’s labor through long-term training agreements upheld by formal or informal sanction. For instance, it was customary for masters to be vested with the legal prerogatives of fathers, which included rights of ownership.29 They raised the trainee’s cost of default by demanding entry fees, by setting apprentices’ wages on a rising scale for the contract’s duration, and by promising a pay-off upon completion.30 They addressed problems of adverse selection by stipulating entrance requirements that signaled the laborer’s quality or provided surety against misbehavior, such as place of residence, family income, or the father’s occupation.31 Analogously, the entry fee to the guild was a mortgage on trust, which was used to deter lesser-known masters from exploiting the guild for short-term advantage; and which accounts for the nearly universal practice of fixing low or non-existent fees for masters’ next of kin.32 In some highly specialized and cyclical industries, like Alpine mining, iron-making, ship building and high-quality masonry, skills were often kept within closely knit kin networks; rather than a sign of restrictive practice, however, this is more likely to be because the higher risks of those industries restricted the supply of apprentices.

Equally, apprentices needed to be protected against the opportunism of their masters. They were liable to be exploited as cheap labor, which could be discharged before gaining the agreed skills. Because apprentices learned

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27 Examples of poaching in Lis and Soly, “Irresistible Phalanx,” p. 41; and Coulet, “Confréries,” p. 70.
29 Steinfeld, Invention; see also Lipson, Economic History, vol. 1, pp. 312–13.
30 Degrassi, Economia, pp. 55–56; Snell, Annals, pp. 256–57; and Gay Davies, Enforcement, p. 10. Since the opportunity costs of default were higher for older trainees and the costs of socialization were lower, the length of apprenticeship declined with age at entry (Rappaport, Worlds, p. 321). Such restrictions did not apply to younger members of the craftsman’s family, for whom no formal contract was required; the weight of paternal authority was sanction enough (Epstein, Wage Labor, pp. 104–05).
31 For entrance requirements, see for example, Gay Davies, Enforcement, pp. 1, 5, 9.
32 Farr, Hands, pp. 22–23.
craft-specific skills within oligopsonistic labor markets, they suffered serious loss if they were discharged early or were poorly trained. Guilds therefore passed rules to enforce adequate training. Like masters, apprentices had to be vested with appropriate rights (including a guarantee of proficiency and security of employment over at least one economic cycle) in order to invest in capabilities. To comply with these obligations guilds placed apprentices with a new master if the first one died. In sum, opportunism by both parties explains both why the contracts appear to be excessively long, and why the relation between length and requisite skills is seldom straightforward.

In order to allocate skilled labor efficiently, masters required mechanisms for screening job applicants and trained apprentices (journeymen) required information about the labor market. Both conditions were easily met in small-scale labor markets with low rates of in- and out-migration, and by the later Middle Ages local markets for partly trained apprentices were making the task easier. As commodity markets increased in size and supply shocks intensified, however, more sophisticated arrangements to pool information and improve labor mobility emerged. Innovations of this kind seem to have occurred mainly during two phases. The first phase coincided with the sharp demographic downturn and the localized but virulent epidemics following the Black Death of 1348 to 1350 and with the ensuing reorganization of regional markets. A second phase of integration occurred during the seventeenth century, again at a time of demographic stagnation when many European regional economies were being restructured into fledgling supra-regional and national markets.

Skilled workers in scarce supply established regional and later national associations to pool information and devised training credentials that were recognized by craft masters across a broad area. Both innovations appeared

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34 On this account, which complements standard human capital theory (Becker, *Theory*), length of apprenticeship would be a function of physical and human asset specificity within a craft; see Williamson, *Economic Organization*, pp. 178, 187; Demsetz, “Theory,” pp. 169–72; and Pagano, “Property Rights.” The existence of a significant positive link between length of apprenticeship and requisite skills could be tested by using wage dispersion as a proxy for skills.


36 For late medieval regional integration, see Epstein, “Cities” and “Regional Fairs”; for seventeenth-century integration, see Reed, “Transactions Costs.” For the chronology of journeymen associations, see Sonenscher, *Work*, chap.9; and Lis and Soly, “Irresistible Phalanx,” pp. 24–28. Informal networks of skilled laborers had probably existed since the thirteenth century in the highly specialized and seasonal building, shipping and mining industries (Vergani and Ludwig, “Mobilität”); before 1350 only journeymen weavers in German and Swiss towns had autonomous associations (Lis and Soly, “Irresistible Phalanx,” p. 19). In central and northern Italy, the religious movement of the Umiliati was associated in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries with highly mobile, technically skilled woolen weavers (Epstein, *Wage Labor*, pp. 93–98). It thus combined the skills-enhancing features of guilds and the security-enhancing features of journeymen’s associations.
in strength during the late medieval phase of labor-market integration, at which time it became common to provide certificates of apprenticeship making journeymen employable across firms. Organizations of journeymen spanning several regions or associations of towns were recorded in Switzerland, Germany, England, France, and the southern Low Countries. Significantly, such associations were less present in the more highly urbanized regions of Europe (north and central Italy, Flanders and the northern Netherlands, and northern France), where information flows were more intensive. During the second, seventeenth-century phase of integration, these arrangements expanded into interregional and international networks of compagnonnages and other semisecret journeymen associations. Although such developments benefitted masters, they also gave journeymen leverage to restrict the numbers of apprentices. Masters therefore consistently opposed such associations, at first by establishing countervailing interurban alliances of guilds that organized coordinated lockouts, and subsequently by resorting to state-backed repression.

**DID CRAFTS OPPOSE TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE?**

The argument that the main purpose of the craft guilds was to transmit skills raises the question of their relation to technological innovation, particularly in view of the crafts' formidable reputation for technical conservatism. This reputation rests on the assertion that guilds produced no endogenous innovation (mainly because they enforced strict manufacturing procedures by means of official “searches” of members’ premises) and that they refused to adopt innovations from outside.

Evidence that guilds set rigid technical standards that stifled innovation is far from compelling. On the one hand, it seems reasonable to assume that the factors that made it hard to regulate the labor market applied just as strongly to technology. Because of administrative limitations and disagreements within the guilds themselves, in the larger cities—where the number of wealthier masters who were more likely to favor technical innovation was proportionally greater—officials only visited a small proportion of shops on predefined dates and routes. It is in any case far from clear that the main

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37 Gay Davies, *Enforcement*, p. 264 fn. 9; Truant, *Rites*, chap.2; and Thrupp, “Gilds,” p. 280. Rising labor mobility may also account for the greater use from the late Middle Ages of the masterpiece to assess skills; see Cahn, *Masterpieces*, chap. 1; and Unger, *Dutch Shipbuilding*, p. 76.

38 Lis and Soly, “Irresistible Phalanx,” pp. 22–35. For the chronology of journeymen associations see also Truant, *Rites*; and Leeson, *Travelling Brothers*.


40 Farr, *Hands*, p. 37; and Rappaport, *Worlds*, p. 111. In the seventeenth century, when London was approaching half a million inhabitants, the Coopers visited no more than 30 workplaces every three months; examinations were necessarily selective (Berlin, “Broken,” p. 80).
purpose of searches was to enforce technical standards to maintain reputation in outside markets, since controls of this kind were made in any case by the guild officers or the merchants who sealed the goods for export, and craftsmen resented searches that could breach their trade secrets. For all these reasons, searches were rather unusual. Where they did apply, they are better understood as a symbolic means of reassuring the poorer craftsmen who had the most to lose from technological innovation, while also maintaining the artisans’ assent to the corporate hierarchy.

On the other hand, technological innovation was not easily controlled. Technical infringements were far harder to monitor than the use of illegal workers because guild “searchers” could only establish deviations from stipulated standards by observing the final product. It was therefore possible to introduce process innovations without incurring sanctions. Craft guilds seem in any case to have accepted the existence of competing processes and techniques—an attitude that the mercantilist policies of governments and town administrations reinforced, as we shall see later. Thus, the standard oath sworn by an early modern London apprentice stipulated that he “his said master faithfully his secrets keep.” Even on the evidence of guild statutes, which exaggerate craft conservatism, statutory technical restrictions seem to have declined after the later Middle Ages, suggesting that innovation was becoming more accepted in the face of expanding markets and competition.

The claim that guilds tended spontaneously to oppose outside innovations is also problematic. One reason is that it is excessively generic. If it is meant to say that guilds never innovated, it is demonstrably false; if it is meant to say that guilds would at some point become technically conservative, it loses any predictive value. The argument is also methodologically naive. Al-

41 For the reputational purposes of searches, see Richardson, “Brand Names.” For the incidence of searches see Thrupp, “Gilds,” p. 256; Lipson, Economic History, vol. 3, pp. 335, 340, 343; Ward, Metropolitan Communities, pp. 126–43; and Deceulaer, “Guilds,” pp. 178–79. For strong resistance to searches see ibid., p. 178 and fn. 25. A major purpose of searches was to verify the quality and status of apprentices, and in England this seems to have become their main function from the late seventeenth century (Berlin, “Broken,” p. 86).
42 Ibid., p. 83.
43 The difficulty in monitoring the manufacturing process explains why guild demarcations were based on product, not process (Marshall, “Capitalism,” p. 24). For similar reasons, guilds never specified the content of apprentices’ teaching, since their proficiency could only be evaluated ex post.
44 Rappaport, Worlds, p. 234; my emphasis. Searchers from the guild of gold and silver wire-drawers in seventeenth-century London agreed to keep officers who were also potential competitors out of a member’s work room because he feared losing his trade secrets (Berlin, “Broken,” p. 82). In the Venetian glass industry, craftsmen recorded their technical innovations in secret “recipe books,” several hundreds of which survive (Trivellato, “Was Technology”). In 1574 the town council of Memmingen interviewed four linen masters on the techniques of bleaching, revealing extreme variation in what were closely guarded secrets (Safley, “Production,” pp. 130–31). See also below, notes 76–79.
45 For a systematic analysis of this point for early modern Italy, whose guilds are claimed to have been particularly conservative, see Lanaro, “Statuti.” See also Hatcher and Barker, History, pp. 142–44.
though it assumes that all applications that were refused were better than current practice, in practice the record seldom reveals whether guild opposition was driven by rent-seeking or by an objective assessment of the innovation's merits. For example, in 1543 in Amiens the city council agreed to pay the inventor of a more efficient furnace for dyeing, but only if it proved to be useful. In the case of the widespread refusal in the late thirteenth century by high-quality cloth makers to adopt the fulling mill, which is often cited as proof of guild obscurantism, we now know that the early mills were resisted because they damaged better quality fabrics, and opposition melted away once the machine had been improved. What is more, there is surprisingly little evidence to support the implied suggestion that technological obstruction had disastrous consequences for individual guilds or for entire towns. While it is generally the case that innovative regions or cities showed symptoms of technological stagnation over time, the precise role of guilds in this process is not at all clear, as we shall see. Finally, the argument reifies the guild, by postulating a degree of internal homogeneity and a communality of interests over technological change that is quite misleading.

Individual instances of resistance to change tell us little about relations between the guilds and technological progress in general. A theory of guild innovation must identify both the technical and the political criteria that dictated the choice of technology and established a given technological path. The outlines of such a theory can be sketched as follows. The preceding discussion has indicated that craft-based innovation would generally aim to save capital and enhance skills. The reasons for this preference become clear if one examines the two hypothetical alternatives open to master artisans, the use of unskilled labor on the one hand, and of capital-intensive machinery on the other. When craft guilds were first established between the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, craft shops were unable to draw on unskilled labor because of underdeveloped spot labor markets and the seasonal character of the rural labor supply. Subsequently, they resisted a move that would have exposed them to major diseconomies of scale in monitoring compared with protoindustry and factory production. Crafts avoided investing in capital-intensive machinery for similar reasons. Initially, they did so because of the lack of spot markets in capital goods, and because the use of firm-specific capital stock within highly unstable markets exposed producers to excessive risk. Subsequently, they avoided capital-intensive innovations because these devalued investments in current skills and reduced incentives to invest in new ones.

46 Heller, Labour, p. 25.
47 Malanima, Piedi, chap.4.
48 Millward, “Emergence,” p. 33. Even if high-cost machinery had been available for lease, master artisans would still have faced higher costs than capitalists because they had weaker incentives to maintain the equipment in good shape.
In principle, therefore, one would expect the crafts to prefer technology that privileged skill-enhancing, capital-saving factors. Despite a lack of systematic research, evidence from patent records indicates that this was precisely the kind of innovation that prevailed in England before the mid- to late eighteenth century, when the country’s guilds were still very active. Between 1660 and 1799, labor-saving innovations accounted for less than 20 percent of the total, whereas innovations aimed at saving capital (especially working capital) and at quality improvements accounted for more than 60 percent. There is no reason to believe that patterns elsewhere in Europe were very different.49

On the other hand, we might expect that craftsmen would oppose capital-intensive and labor-saving innovations that tended to substitute transferable with generic wage labor, or that raised fixed capital costs in the industry and thereby shifted control over the production process from the owners of skills to the owners of capital.50 In practice, the reaction of individual crafts was the outcome of factors that were defined primarily by political rather than by market forces. There was a fundamental difference in outlook between the poorer craftsmen, who had low capital investments and drew their main source of livelihood from their skills, and who therefore (frequently in alliance with the journeymen) opposed capital-intensive and labor-saving innovations, and the wealthier artisans who looked on such changes more favourably. For example, in sixteenth-century Liège, the small drapers opposed improved looms fearing that they would advantage the larger producers, whereas in seventeenth-century London, ribbon-making Dutch or engine looms up to eight times as productive as the traditional hand loom were introduced by “silkmen, wholesalers and master weavers” against fierce opposition by the “rank and file [of the Weavers’ Company] ... small masters and journeymen.” The balance of power between the two major interest groups within guilds was therefore crucial for successful innovation. Thus if, as is often claimed, manufacturing became more concentrated during the early modern period, one would expect to find increased corporate disunity to be associated with higher rates of technological change.51

The decision to innovate was also affected by relations between the guilds’ constituencies and the state. On the one hand, the wealthier and more innovative masters were more likely to influence government policy, and under normal circumstances authorities seem to have allowed them to cir-

49 MacLeod, Inventing, chap.9. In the textile industry, nonlabor saving innovations accounted for 70 percent of the total before 1770 (Griffiths, Hunt, and O’Brien, “Activity,” pp. 892–95).


51 Quotations from Berlin, “Broken,” pp. 84–85; see also Ward, Metropolitan Communities, chap.6. For Liège see Thrupp, “Gilds,” p. 273. See also ibid., pp. 255, 256, 257; Friedrichs, Early Modern City, p. 97; and Lis and Soly, “Irresistible Phalanx,” pp. 33, 37, 39–48.
cumvent guild regulations. On the other hand, city councils were more willing to meet the small masters’ concerns if labor-saving innovations coincided with a serious economic downturn, both to ensure social and political stability and to restrain unemployed craftsmen from leaving the town. In other words, guilds were most likely to act as “recession cartels” when economic circumstances took a turn for the worse, but they still required political support to enforce cartel restrictions successfully against free riders and competing guilds. Thus, Dutch guilds began to resort systematically to restrictive policies when the country entered a long phase of stagnation after the mid-seventeenth century—but only after obtaining municipal approval.

Relations between guilds and the state could also influence innovation in the opposite direction. In Ancien Regime France, for example, rather than the craft guilds it was frequently the state, in alliance with local political and mercantile elites, which developed the vast system of quality regulation over exported goods decried by economic historians. Moreover, following a pattern that we shall see at work also in Venice and Milan, it was frequently an alliance between the mercantilist state and the great merchants that actually stifled artisan innovation aimed at lowering costs. Thus, the invention of a new silk loom in seventeenth-century Lyon was rejected not by the local silk guild (which did not exist at this time), but by the Italian importers of manufactured silk who put pressure on their clients to oppose it. In 1728, new machinery similar to the gig-mill devised by artisans in Languedoc was destroyed by the state cloth inspectors; in 1732, the latter opposed a device “remarkably similar to the flying shuttle, ‘invented’ one year later in England.”

Since the consequences of both internal and external factors were defined by institutional, social, and economic conditions that were mostly beyond the guilds’ control, the latter’s response to technological change varied considerably with circumstances. Here we can usefully distinguish between “one-off” and systemic protectionism. One-off protectionism by individual guilds did occur, although the records inflate both its incidence (crackpot inventors were never in short supply) and its effects (what one guild refused another was likely to adopt). By contrast, systemic protectionism was the effect of

52 A Venetian decree of 1631 attempted to recall forty glassmakers of Murano who had fled the city during the plague of 1630–1631 (Francesca Trivellato, personal communication).
53 De Vries and van der Woude, First Modern Economy, pp. 294 (for the silk industry), 340–41, 582; and Unger, Dutch Shipbuilding, chap. 5. Deceulaer, “Guilds,” pp. 194–95, 197 also finds that litigation in Antwerp increased at times of economic contraction. However, there is little hard evidence that technological obstruction increased significantly as a consequence of economic stagnation; see Davids, “Shifts,” pp. 349–53.
55 Florence’s first recorded patent was awarded in 1421 to Filippo Brunelleschi for a revolutionary new ship that would haul loads more cheaply to the city. The machine was “a technical fiasco that
broader, politically enforced competitive restrictions, which led or sometimes forced guilds to adopt more restrictive behavior. I have already remarked upon the conservative role played on occasion by merchants and government elites in premodern France. It has been argued similarly that the Dutch Republic’s relative manufacturing decline and the southern Netherlands’ continued industrial strength after the mid-seventeenth century were due to the different balance of power between merchants and craftsmen in the two regions. Whereas in Holland, Dutch merchants restrained industrial developments that threatened the import trade and were frequently able to dismantle guild regulations entirely, in Flanders craftsmen had greater freedom to continue a centuries-long tradition of innovation. If ever guild conservatism assumed systemic proportions, it appears to have been more effect than cause of its society’s economic ills.56

Developments in England reinforce this conclusion. The most distinctive feature of English guilds compared to most of their Continental peers was not so much a generic weakness, as is often assumed, for they continued to be the main source of specialized training up to at least the third quarter of the eighteenth century. Rather, it was the relative decline in their political links with the state and with merchant corporations after the English Civil War, at the same time that such links were being either maintained or strengthened on the Continent. The preceding discussion suggests that this institutional decoupling, which made restrictive legislation increasingly hard to enforce but maintained the technological benefits of the guild system after the 1660s, may have given post-Restoration England the technological edge over the Continent. Significantly, the English—who had previously always been net technological importers—began to worry about exporting technical secrets from around 1715.57 The key to the different performance by craft guilds in different European countries lies in the institutional and political framework in which they were embedded.

failed to carry a single load to Florence” (Long, “Invention,” pp. 878–89). An example of an innovation surviving localized opposition was the ribbon loom: repressed in Danzig around 1579, it was patented in Holland in 1604 (Mokyr, Lever, p. 179) and was introduced in London around 1614 (Ward, Metropolitan Communities, p. 128).

56 Lis and Soly, “Different Paths.” For the suggestion that Dutch guilds declined from the third quarter of the seventeenth century following strong political attacks, see Hickson and Thompson, “New Theory,” pp. 132–33. For the negative effects on guild attitudes of the conservative turn of an entire society see instead Walker, German Home Towns, pp. 89–92; Chicco, “Innovazione”; and below, for Venice and Milan.

57 On the more liberal turn in domestic policy after the English Civil War, which undermined the guilds’ privileges but did not affect their role in training, see Lipson, Economic History, vol. 3, pp. 265, 280–81, 286–89, 324–27, 342. However, eighteenth-century English guilds were far from a spent political force; for example, they lobbed strongly against attempts to raise excise on manufactured products (Brewer, Sinews, pp. 231–49). On the balance of trade in technology see Harris, “First British Measures.”
DID CRAFTS INNOVATE?

Craft innovation was the outcome of small-scale and incremental practical experiment and of random variation. Crafts had no wish to publicize innovation; most guild “secrets” appear in the records only after they had been illicitly transferred. Inasmuch as corporate supervision had any effect, it tried to ensure that an individual’s discovery was kept within the guild membership. Because craft innovation is less apparent than outright opposition, identifying the origins of an innovation (as distinct from its purveyors) is rather like finding the inventor of a joke. Jokes typically have no author.

Even so, evidence of anonymous improvements within guilds is readily available, although their impact is hard to quantify. In a rare estimate of the gains from craft innovation, Walter Endrei has suggested that labor productivity in the high-quality woollen industry under guild control increased by about 240 percent between the late thirteenth and the seventeenth centuries; productivity gains in weaving were over 300 percent. Gains in labor productivity of the order of 750 percent were achieved in the heavily gilded book industry in Lyon between c.1500 and 1572; but the precise manner by which this was done is unknown. Harder to quantify but equally significant gains in the volume and sophistication of production of that most intellectually demanding machine, the mechanical clock, occurred after it became organized in formal crafts in early sixteenth-century south Germany. Further references to equally nameless improvements, including instances of deliberate experimentation, are found scattered across the literature.

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58 Discussing the possibility that God’s mind was not perfect and had therefore not created the best of all possible worlds, David Hume came up with the following description of preindustrial technological change as a stochastic process: “If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter, who framed so complicated useful and beautiful a machine? And what surprise must we entertain, when we find him [God] a stupid mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, deliberations, and controversies, had been gradually improving? Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out: Much labor lost: Many fruitless trials made; And a slow, but continued improvement carried on during infinite ages in the art of world-making” (Dialogues, p. 77).

59 Epstein, Wage Labor, p. 140. Dennet, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, p. 99, draws an analogy between speciation and the invention and transmission of jokes, but his point applies equally well to preindustrial technology. On patents and guilds, see MacLeod, Inventing, p. 83. For guild “secrets” see notes 44, 76–79.

60 Endrei, “Changements”; Zemon Davis, “Trade Union,” p. 53 fn. 3; and Mayr, Authority, pp. 8–9.

61 Wire-makers in Nürnberg, who experimented from 1390 on the invention of automatic machines, devised a wire-drawing bench operated by water power around 1410 (Ashtor, “Factors,” p. 33); Murano glassmakers kept secret recipe books with experimental data (Trivellato, “Was Technology”). For innovations see Endrei, “Rouet”, pp. 74, 79 (pedal-actioned loom in late eleventh-century Flanders; spinning wheel in Tortosa in the 1450s); Irigoin, “Origines” (rag paper invented in late thirteenth-century Fabriano); Hirshler, “Medieval Economic Competition,” p. 55 (a new wheel combining the twisting and spinning of silk yarn in Cologne, 1397); de Vries and van der Woud, First Modern Economy, p. 276 (innovations by Dutch beer brewers in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries); Malanima,
An apparent lack of innovation can also disguise a far more complex situation. Although most commentators claim that guild conservatism caused the Italian economy to stagnate after the mid-seventeenth century, the most frequently cited example of guild-induced sclerosis, Venice, has only recently been tested against the records. It is now apparent that seventeenth-century Venetian guilds—whose technical leadership in glass making, dyeing, mirror making, cloth-of-gold weaving, soap production and high-quality printing had been gradually eroded over the preceding two centuries by European competitors—did in fact respond innovatively to competition. However, the authorities frequently frustrated their activities. Attempts by craftsmen in dyeing and wool weaving and in the shipbuilding industry to lower fixed capital costs were systematically opposed by the regulatory agencies of the Venetian state. Venice’s failure to adapt to cheaper foreign competition was due not to the sclerosis of its guilds, but to its merchant oligarchy’s desire to preserve the quality standards that upheld the city’s industrial reputation. A similar response by merchants may have caused the decline of manufacturing in Milan; elsewhere in Italy also recent scholarship has tended to exonerate the guilds from responsibility for the country’s plight after 1650.

An equally striking reversal of conventional wisdom has occurred regarding the Dutch Republic’s Golden Age between c. 1580 and 1680, which was believed to be the result of strong technical innovation associated with liberal institutional arrangements, including unusually weak craft guilds. Recent scholarship has shown instead that corporations pervaded Dutch

Decadenza, pp. 151–52, 238–43 (sixteenth-century innovations in Tuscan silk, wool and linen cloth production); Safley, “Production,” pp. 122–23 (sixteenth-century invention of cheaper linen thread in the Upper Swabian linen industry); Heller, Labour, pp. 25, 180–81 (a machine for rolling satin in Amiens in 1543, and a new silk loom in seventeenth-century Lyon); Thompson, “Variations,” p. 71 (new Dutch- and Seau-style wool cloth introduced by the Clermont-de-Lodeve cloth guild in the 1650s); Thompson, Clermont, pp. 331–32, 336–38 (innovations in clothmaking in 1748, including the use of the flying shuttle); Hafter, “Programmed Brocade Loom”, p. 54 (guildsmen invent the precursor of the Jacquard loom in late eighteenth-century Lyon to save on female labor); Sabel and Zeitlin, “Historical Alternatives”, p. 168 and fn. 85 (innovations by the eighteenth-century ribbon weavers of Saint-Etienne). See also below, notes 63, 65.

62 Cipolla, “Decline.”

63 For innovations see Trivellato, “Was Technology” (Murano glass industry); Rapp, Industry, p. 108 (silk-stocking making); and Della Valentina, “Artigiani” (silk cloth industry). For stalled innovations in the cloth and dyeing industries, see Rapp, Industry, pp. 112–16; for a proposal in 1665 by a local craftsman to build a ship on a Dutch model “of a quality not seen here for 35 years,” which was ignored by the authorities, see Davis, Shipbuilders, p. 43 and fn. 139, with further examples in the same footnote. For innovations at an earlier date, see Lane, Venice, pp. 320–21.

64 In the mid-seventeenth century the Milanese woolen producers listed six reasons why rural manufacturers to the north of the city made cloth more cheaply: they paid lower excise on oil and wool, and paid no taxes to the merchant guild in Milan; property rents were lower; they dealt directly with the spinners and thus employed the best; and they did not have to employ more expensive Milanese weavers. In fact, according to Beonio Brocchieri, “Piazza universale,” pp. 300–01, who reports this document, Milanese manufacturers had no difficulty employing cheaper weavers in the hinterland. Thus, the only source of higher costs attributed to craft guilds did not in fact apply. See Vigo, Uno stato, p. 75 for Milan; and Sella, Italy, pp. 35–41.
society—well over one-fifth of seventeenth-century Amsterdam’s population belonged to a craft—and that the majority of guilds arose precisely during the boom years of 1610 to 1670. Dutch craft guilds—including those associated with the two industrial sectors in which the Dutch excelled, shipbuilding and windmill technology—were at the forefront of technological innovation, both through inventions within their ranks and in their adoption of novelties from abroad. Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude have followed up on these discoveries by suggesting that Dutch economic success was in part a consequence of the country’s high number of guilds, which ensured a correspondingly high level of investment in human capital.65

There is thus clear evidence both that guilds produced and adopted innovations and that under certain circumstances (including economic recession, the dominance of production by small-scale producers, and merchant and state regulation for export) guilds opposed them. However, innovation was not just a consequence of random institutional variation. Craft guilds increased the supply of technology systematically in three ways: by establishing a favorable environment for technical change; by promoting technical specialization through training and technical recombination through artisan mobility; and by providing inventors with monopoly rents.

The first source of innovation was an unintended consequence of the apprenticeship system itself. Artisans could only monitor apprenticeship rules effectively if they located their shops in the same area.66 Clustering, which was a typical feature of premodern crafts, was likely in turn to produce positive organizational and technological externalities. Thus, Bologna maintained its leadership in silk throwing for two centuries because ties of kin and neighborhood sustained collaboration between firms, the circulation of apprentices between firms ensured that innovations were diffused, and control over the raw silk inputs from the countryside gave rise to economies of scale and specialization.67 Nonetheless, marginal innovations of the kind most likely to be fostered by individual craft districts would tend to run into diminishing returns as the costs of breaking out of the prevailing technologi-
cal pattern increased. Although in premodern, unintegrated markets QWERTY phenomena were less likely to prevail because the sunk costs and externalities of individual technologies were smaller, path-dependency and inbreeding were unavoidable in the long run if distinct technological pools did not interact. In preindustrial economies, technological cross-fertilization occurred overwhelmingly through artisan migration.

Technological transfer took place through the permanent emigration of master artisans and the temporary migration of journeymen. The former was analogous to the breakaway under industrial capitalism of small firms from larger ones; both were a functional consequence of the guild system, which imparted skills that increased the masters’ and journeymen’s mobility.

Masters offered their services to competitors either voluntarily or to escape religious persecution, economic hardship or warfare. Although guilds might object to integrating alien craftsmen bearing new techniques, opposition seems to have been neither frequent nor very effective. Competition between states fostered technological diffusion. Particularly after the post-Reformation confessionalization of politics, European rulers made it a point to attract displaced craftsmen from enemy lands. The Huguenot migrations to Geneva and England and the wholesale transfer of artisan skills from Brabant to the Netherlands after the sacking of Antwerp in 1585 are just three threads in an intricate web of politically driven technical diffusion.

Alternatively, artisans were lured from the most technologically advanced cities with financial and legal inducements and, if necessary, protection from guild obstruction; in this way a Murano glassmaker was brought to England in the 1630s by paying him five to ten times his earnings in Venice.

Guilds responded by banning artisan emigration, but weak administrations and state competition made restrictions hard to enforce. The only fail-safe way to stop members departing was to offer them stronger inducements to stay. Crafts could do this through rent streams and “club benefits,” such as a guild’s brand name which raised demand for its products, or a personal reputation for skills which attracted better apprentices. As it was, most artisan migrants ended up being incorporated in another guild. This was not...
just because it made technical sense (since only other trained workers could interpret the new information effectively), but also because the host guild often saw integration as a way of controlling alien competitors.  

Technological transfer through traveling journeymen was an equally inescapable consequence of the craft guild system. Although innovation of this kind has attracted less attention, the greater scale and regularity of journeyman tramping compared with permanent artisan migration suggests that its effects may have been proportionally stronger. The fears of corporate espionage that journeymen raised among masters, the existence of "clandestine," nongilded, journeymen competitors, and the fact that the most technically advanced sectors (mining, shipbuilding, building, luxury textile production and printing) also had the most mobile labor force, reveal the journeymen’s role in transferring technology. The main qualitative difference between the two sources of technical diffusion was probably the fact that forced migration helped transfer technology across linguistic and national boundaries, whereas journeymen’s travels were mostly restricted to areas that were institutionally and culturally more homogeneous.

The third source of guild support for technological innovation originated with the inventors themselves. Deliberate inventions will not be forthcoming if the inventor cannot claim more than his proportional share of the gains. Of the three possible solutions to this problem (state support for primary research, patent rights to discovery, and secrecy and the transmission of secrets through training), only the last two were available in our period. However, despite the fact that the patent was a late medieval invention and

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74 The statutes of the Florentine silk guild stipulated that foreign inventors be encouraged to settle (Ashtor, “Factors,” pp. 26–27); see also Hirshler, “Medieval Economic Competition,” p. 53. English statutes passed in 1523 and 1529 forbade foreign artisans from employing other strangers as apprentices, and foreigners working in London and its suburbs were placed under the control of the London companies (Esser, “Germans,” p. 24). In 1684–1688 Huguenot innovations were allowed by the London Weavers’ guild conditional upon the use of English weavers and upon integration into the craft (Macleod, Inventing, pp. 83–84).

75 See Reith, “Arbeitsmigration.” Although precise numbers of traveling journeymen are unavailable, the most recent overview states that “tramping [was] a characteristic feature of the social constitution of the crafts in Central Europe and very common in England and France” (Lis and Soly, “Irresistible Phalanx,” p. 18). In Vienna in 1742, less than a quarter of the more than 4,000 master artisans had been born in the city. The rest, together with the tramping journeymen, came from “the entirety of German-speaking Europe,” with a core area measuring 700 km across from the Upper Rhine to the Danube (Ehmer, “Worlds,” p. 179–80). In eighteenth-century France, fewer than a fifth of the journeymen employed in the building, furnishing, clothing, and victualling trades appear to have been born in the towns in which they worked (Sonenischer, Work, p. 295).

76 For corporate espionage see Simon, “Labor Relations,” p. 141; Poni, “Per la storia,” p. 103; Davids, “Openness”; and Davidson, “Northern Italy,” p. 160. The Württemberg Black Forest worsted guild attempted to prevent journeymen from exporting their technical secrets in the late seventeenth century (Ogilvie, State Corporatism, p. 358). For nongilded craftsmen see above, note 20. In 1459 master and journeyman masons involved in building major churches across Central Europe met at Regensburg to discuss craft questions and to stipulate that no one should be taught for money—with the implication that technical information was to be freely shared (Black, Guilds, p. 9).
was frequently applied during the early modern period, the current use of patents is in essence a nineteenth-century development.\(^77\) The most significant premodern incentive for invention was thus the capacity to capture the rents provided by a technical secret; and the most effective source of these rents was the craft guild—which significantly was known originally as \textit{misterium} or, as in England, craft “mystery” as opposed to religious “fraternity.”\(^78\)

In the absence of specific research on the topic, one can only speculate as to how an inventor and his craft guild would react to a discovery. In principle, it is unlikely that craft guilds could extort a “secret” from its inventor by force. Only a willing teacher could transmit the kind of trial-and-error discoveries that dominated craft innovation, and a badly treated artisan could easily defect. In any case, although technical secrets were often kept within the craftsman’s family, it is unlikely that significant breakthroughs could withstand a guild’s scrutiny for long.\(^79\) On the other hand, an inventor had to weigh the guild’s offer of a temporary quasi-monopoly rent against the possibility of obtaining a one-off royalty (net of migration costs) from a rival craft or government. Although the costs of emigration were not negligible, the fact that most trades faced low capital barriers to entry increased the competitive value of technical secrets. Ceteris paribus, the larger the market and the higher the potential super-profits, the greater the probability that technological recombination would occur through migration.

Craft-based invention and the multicentered, competitive institutional setting in which it was embedded came close to resembling an ideal market structure for innovation. Thus, technological diffusion seems to have been constrained less by guild coercion than by the lack of efficient channels of information about the gains to be reaped from migration. The guilds’ contri-

\(^77\) Long, “Invention,” pp. 875, 879–81; and MacLeod, “Paradoxes,” pp. 894–909. Davids, “Technological Change”, pp. 95–96 emphasizes the role of patenting for technical innovation during the Dutch Golden Age; for a more skeptical view see de Vries and van der Woude, \textit{First Modern Economy}, p. 345. One reason why patented innovation was less likely to work was cognitive: under circumstances in which technological knowledge was preeminently an embodied practice, only tried and tested innovations were likely to succeed. This fact was recognized but misunderstood by William Petty, who lamented that inventors were scorned by “the generality of men” if the “new practices have not been thoroughly tried” (Petty, \textit{Treatise}, p. 53, cited by Mokyr, “Innovation,” p. 2).

\(^78\) See Long, “Invention,” pp. 859–60, who suggests that the first proprietary approach to invention evolved within medieval guilds. She also draws the useful distinction between secrets as “techniques” that could only be learned through practice, and “intentionally concealed” knowledge, which was new.

\(^79\) In early modern Holland, some guilds seem to have devised a system of sharing innovations during compulsory annual meetings; see Unger, \textit{Dutch Shipbuilding}, p. 80. The arrangement was presumably based on a combination of prizes for inventors and credible punishments meted out to free riders. The London clockmakers also argued that their craft developed through “small improvements, freely exchanged among craftsmen” (MacLeod, \textit{Inventing}, pp. 83, 188). See also above, notes 74, 76. For the curious case of an employee who stole his Venetian master’s secret recipes for glass-making, sold them to a rival whose daughter he then married, and set up his own furnace with the proceeds, see Long, “Invention,” p. 874.
bution to technological progress was nevertheless largely involuntary, in two distinct senses of the term: because it was most likely to be an unforeseen consequence of everyday practice rather than of systematic experimentation, and because it was an undesirable side effect of artisan and journeyman migration. It was this inherent contradiction between the tendency to devise innovations that could be a source of quasi-monopoly rents, and the need for supra-local, competitive markets for skilled labor that supported technical diffusion, which imparted to the premodern craft system its main source of technical dynamism.

WHY DID CRAFT GUILDS PERSIST?

The view of the craft guilds as rent-seekers assumes that they operated in markets with very high economic and political barriers to entry. On the evidence we have reviewed, these obstacles have been exaggerated. Competitive markets were ubiquitous and hard to avoid. Powerful competitive pressures in manufacturing and between states meant that it was possible to delay an innovation locally, but it was much harder to stop it in its tracks. The prevailing emphasis on what the guilds chose to do, and the related stress on their resistance to technical innovation, may therefore be doubly misplaced. On the one hand, the ubiquity of free riding, of rule evasion, and of a mobile labor force together with the competitive policies of towns and sovereign states systematically undermined the guilds’ powers of coercion. On the other hand, if technological innovation was for the most part a consequence of mechanisms beyond the guilds’ control, we should be focusing on what the craft guilds and their members were compelled to do by market and institutional pressures, rather than on what they sometimes attempted to impose.

The broader implications of these claims for the course of premodern technology can only be touched upon briefly. If premodern markets were sufficiently competitive to make technological conservatism self-defeating, the question why craft guilds were able to survive as a mode of industrial organization for more than half a millennium is cast in a new light. In recent debates on protoindustrialisation and on the rise of the centralized factory it has been suggested that both systems won out over craft-based production because they were technologically more dynamic and enjoyed significant economies of scale. What this argument does not explain, however, is the coexistence for several centuries of several alternative modes of organization under the undisputed technological leadership of guild-based production.

Although centralized “factories” existed no later than the fourteenth century, they were never of more than marginal importance before the nineteenth. Thus, the main preindustrial competitor of craft-based production was the rural putting-out system known as protoindustry. However, because
of protoindustry’s lack of formal training and the dispersed character of production, which substantially raised monitoring costs, it seems to have been technologically sluggish and to have delivered little endogenous innovation. Moreover, rural industry found it difficult to incorporate exogenous innovation without undergoing structural change. Because major technical change caused either labor skilling or capital intensification, protoindustry displayed a tendency to move either “back” into craft production, “forwards” into factory industrialism, or “sideways” into sweatshops. Comparison with its organizational competitors therefore suggests that it was the technological edge provided by institutionalized apprenticeship, by its associated specialized labor markets, and by the quasi-monopoly rents over innovation that underpinned the craft guild’s long-term survival. For centuries, alternative arrangements were out-competed, restricted to low-skill manufactures like protoindustry, or forced to inhabit institutional niches like centralized manufactories.

See Sokoloff and Dollar, “Agricultural Seasonality,” pp. 316–17, for a recent restatement of this point. The argument cannot easily be tested, because urban craftsmen and rural cottagers tended to engage in different activities. However, it would seem that whereas craft innovations were adopted by rural manufactures, the opposite was unlikely to occur. In Holland, the transfer after 1600 of the shipbuilding industry from the towns to the rural Zaan region was followed by a “striking” decline in technological innovation (de Vries and van der Woude, First Modern Economy, pp. 297–98). The example suggests that the static gains of rural production in terms of cost were offset by a loss in dynamic gains from urban innovation. But urban technology did not always flow very swiftly to the countryside. The Dutch loom, patented in Holland in 1604 and recorded in London around 1614, was adopted by the Lancashire cloth industry only at the beginning of the following century (Walton, Lancashire, p. 64).


The preceding argument raises the question why guilds eventually failed. The short answer is that they did not. In every instance they were abolished by a forcible act of legislation (in 1791 in France, in 1835 in England, in 1869 in Germany), and their training functions were taken up by unions, workers’ and professional associations, and other public (municipal, regional or state) organizations. Nonetheless, it is clear that traditional forms of guild organization were threatened by the rapid expansion of wage labor and by the shift in numerical balance from skilled to unskilled labor, which significantly increased the enforcement costs of apprenticeship. Thus, in England during the second half of the eighteenth century, even as the absolute number of apprenticed individuals increased they were ever less likely to conclude a full apprenticeship (Snell, Annals, pp. 241–43). Apprentices appear to have become more mobile in part because the demand for semiskilled labor was increasing faster than for skilled, and in part because improved means of transport made it harder to restrain the apprentices’ opportunism. Because the guilds’ narrow territorial jurisdiction restricted their coercive powers, it seems likely that under these new conditions they would have had to fuse into regional or national craft organizations to survive. To do so, however, meant successfully facing down the state. Although the state’s attack on the guilds was often justified in economic terms, it is more accurately understood as part of a broader strategy to extend its sovereignty and the associated institutions of citizenship and equality before the law. The guilds, which represented the most deep-rooted and legally quasi-autonomous corporate bodies of the Ancien Régime, posed the main challenge to the modern state’s claim to sovereign power; they therefore had to be destroyed. The extinction of the guilds occurred because of the institutional equivalent of an asteroid from outer space. See Black, Guilds, chaps.12–14 for the intellectual antecedents and consequences of this process.
Given the frequent assertion that skilled craftsmen and innovators played a crucial role in initiating the Industrial Revolution, there is surely some value in enquiring how this pool of skilled labor was created.83 This is all the more the case because according to one estimate, in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries roughly two-thirds of the English male labor force had at one time or another been apprenticed in one of the greater cities, primarily London.84 On this and the other evidence we have examined, the customary dismissal of the role played by craft-based apprenticeship and innovation in British and Continental industrialization may need to be revised.

84 London was a “vocational training centre for a national economy” (Rappaport, Worlds, pp. 77, 314). See idem, “Reconsidering,” for the numerical estimate. Paris and a few other great cities may have performed a similar function in France, where most towns lacked incorporated guilds. An edict by Henri III in 1581 admitted that the majority of artisans in the kingdom worked outside the control of the guilds; he described them however as compagnons, in other words trained craftsmen, presumably because they had learned their trade under a guild (Heller, Labor, p. 51).

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This article uses recently digitized samples of apprentices and masters in London and Bristol to quantify the practice of apprenticeship in the late seventeenth century. Apprenticeship appears much more fluid than is traditionally understood. Many apprentices did not complete their terms of indenture; late arrival and early departure from the master’s household were widespread. Other apprentices appear to have been absent temporarily, returning to the master shortly before the end of their indenture. Regression analysis indicates that the patterns of presence and absence broadly reflect the resources and external opportunities available to apprentices.

The formal structure of early modern apprenticeship was defined by rules established by guilds, cities, and the state. In England, the Statute of Artificers applied London’s existing practices nationwide in 1563. While some details were negotiable, the core of English apprenticeship contracts was fixed by law. Apprentices served for at least seven years, working in exchange for instruction: the fruits of their labour belonged to their masters. In corporate cities, contracts had to be registered with guild, city, or both. Apprentices were under the quasi-parental authority of their masters: their manners, entertainment, and freedom to marry were limited. On completion, the apprentice gained significant legal privileges, including settlement for poor relief, and the right to use his trade and take his own apprentices.

To what extent did apprenticeships follow these rules? This question is of fundamental importance to our understanding of apprenticeship. If rules were not enforced and apprentices left early, how did masters recover their training costs? Could apprenticeship still offer stability or serve to socialize youths into urban life?

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1 The research on which this article is based was supported by the British Academy Grant SG-45038. Catherine Wright provided excellent research assistance on the project. Thanks are also due to Florence Grant. The original dataset of apprentice indentures was kindly supplied by Cliff Webb. The London Metropolitan Archive gave access to the 1695 Index, the Centre for Metropolitan History generously supplied the Poll Tax Database, Gill Newton allowed us to use her double metaphone algorithm, and E. A. Wrigley provided his PST occupational coding data. We also thank the anonymous referees, Rosie Blau, Jane Humphries, Tim Leunig, Margaret Pelling, Maarten Prak, Paul Ryan, Oliver Volckart, the anonymous referees and participants at the North American Conference on British Studies 2007, Economic History Association 2008, Economic History Society 2009, and seminars in Guelph, Kingston, London, Tokyo, and Utrecht for their comments. Our greatest thanks are to Larry Epstein: this article began as a stimulating conversation with Larry, and without his encouragement and trenchant criticism would never have been written.

2 5 Eliz. I, c. 4. On rules, see Wallis, ‘Apprenticeship’, pp. 834–5; Snell, ‘Apprenticeship system’; Dunlop and Denman, English apprenticeship, pp. 72–93; Davies, Enforcement, pp. 1–11. On London’s custom, see Hovland, ‘Apprenticeship’, pp. 151–3. As most English apprentices were male, the generic apprentice is taken here to be male.

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life? Which apprentices abandoned their masters and why? As Kaplan suggested, understanding ‘success’ in apprenticeship requires knowing ‘at what point and why . . . an aspiring apprentice abandon[s] the trajectory’. The manner in which apprenticeship operated also has implications for recent arguments about guilds, human capital formation, and premodern economic growth. Epstein, Humphries, and van Zanden have, respectively, argued that by creating human capital apprenticeship contributed to premodern technological change, precocious economic growth in England, and divergence between Europe and Asia. All three point to the contribution of the institutional framework surrounding apprenticeship: in Epstein’s words, guilds enforced ‘contractual norms that reduced opportunism by masters and apprentices’, permitting long-term exchanges of training and labour services. This positive interpretation of guilds’ involvement in apprenticeship has not gone unchallenged. Ogilvie argues that guilds instead focused on excluding competition. Nonetheless, while masters may have faced little pressure to meet their obligations, her analysis suggests strong incentives for apprentices to fulfil contracts in order to gain privileges from their completion. Arguing along different lines, Davids suggests Dutch guilds played little role in apprenticeship, implying that contract enforcement depended on individuals.

Although one recent survey of European apprenticeship concluded that ‘the overwhelming majority of the apprentices did serve out their contract’, existing evidence on how well apprentices fulfilled their contracts is ambiguous. On the most common measure, the proportion of apprentices becoming masters, apprentices’ completion rates were often below 50 per cent. This presents an empirical challenge to several hypotheses about apprenticeship: how can low completion rates be reconciled with successful guild contract enforcement? Alternatively, why not complete if the main reason for apprenticeship was the privileges derived from completion? However, data on apprentices becoming masters provides only a limited guide to the completion of contracts. Former apprentices could have migrated, remained journeymen, or died. It is usually impossible to tell whether

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8 Davids, ‘Apprenticeship’, pp. 66–70. See also Stabel, ‘Social mobility’, p. 175. Humphries, ‘English apprenticeship’, pp. 87–92, also draws attention to characteristics that could induce commitment to contracts in the absence of guilds.
11 Epstein, ‘Craft guilds, apprenticeship, and technological change’, p. 706, n. 82, noted completion rates but did not discuss their implications. Ogilvie, State corporatism, pp. 157–8, discussed completion rates of weavers in Wurttemberg, and completion rates more generally in eadem, ‘Can we rehabilitate the guilds’ (see above, n. 7), p. 25.
apprentices left early, or if their completion simply went unrecorded. Non-completion was also only one way in which apprentices and masters could breach contracts, and qualitative studies of apprentices’ experiences have shown how far some apprenticeships departed from the rules. Of necessity these analyses rely largely on fragmentary evidence, usually autobiographies and legal records, and cannot identify how frequently rules were ignored.

In this article, we explore the enforcement of apprenticeship rules in early modern England through new evidence about the persistence of apprentices in their contracted masters’ households at various stages of their term of service in London and Bristol in the late seventeenth century. Our sources allow us to examine what proportion of apprentices left early, when they departed, and—through information on their origins and their masters—what differentiates those who left from those who remained. Additionally, citizenship records allow us to examine the relationship between persistence and later becoming a master. Given the range of issues in recent debates on apprenticeship and guilds, we should delineate what we do not examine. We do not consider guilds’ regulation of the content of training. Indeed, we have no information on the training apprentices received. Finally, our evidence excludes apprenticeship outside the corporate system.

Our results indicate that the rules and reality of apprenticeship in early modern England diverged substantially. Despite the law or guild and civic enforcement, the formal procedures of apprenticeship were frequently and consistently evaded. Many apprentices left their masters temporarily or permanently before their terms were completed. Distinctive patterns of absence occurred in particular trades and guilds. Apprentices’ behaviour was broadly consistent with their resources and opportunities. While a completed apprenticeship remained a route to guild privileges, many youths apparently entered service with little intention of remaining with their master for seven years. The superficially rigid rules of apprenticeship disguised a plural and flexible training institution that adapted to the needs and circumstances of individuals. Completion was only one of several possible outcomes of corporate apprenticeship in these English cities.

I

London and Bristol in the late seventeenth century offer useful starting points for examining apprenticeship. Apprentices in England were highly mobile, migrating long distances, serving masters with whom they had no kin or geographical connection, and usually training in occupations different from those of their

12 A few sources record the termination of contracts, but do not state when termination occurred: Ben-Amos, ‘Failure’, pp. 166–7; Steidl, ‘Silk weaver’, pp. 145–50 (although see also p. 135, n. 12); de Munck, Technologies, pp. 190–1.


16 de Munck, Technologies, p. 193, draws a similar conclusion.
fathers. London was England’s largest city, with around half a million inhabitants in 1700. Apprentices were a major category among London’s immigrants. In 1700, around 3,800 youths entered an indenture in London, implying that over 9 per cent of English males became apprentices there. Bristol was the third largest English city, with around 20,000 inhabitants in 1700. Atlantic trade was central to the city, and port-related production made up a further large share of its economy. Bristol’s field of apprentice recruitment was smaller than that of London. Between 1686 and 1696, annually around 250 youths became apprentices in Bristol, largely from the city and neighbouring counties. Beyond sheer numbers, there were other differences in apprenticeship between the cities. Masters operated on a smaller scale in Bristol, where an average master had 1.0 apprentices present in his household, against 1.6 in London. The contrast was greater among wealthy masters: rich London masters had on average 2.4 apprentices present, versus 1.2 for rich Bristol masters.

For both cities we constructed samples of apprentices and their masters in the 1680s and 1690s that identify which apprentices remained with their masters. For London, the sample linked four sources: 48 livery companies’ apprenticeship registers, containing 17,868 apprentices from 1685 to 1695; the 1692 Poll Tax Database, listing c. 13,000 heads of households with their occupation; the Index to the 1695 Marriage Duty Assessments, enumerating 110,000 London inhabitants; and the Association Oath Rolls (1696) recording 21,970 London signatories to an Oath of Loyalty. Each linkage used at least two distinct characteristics, while the Association Oath allowed us to exclude duplicates. Finally, we compared our sample of apprentices and masters with the manuscript household listings for the Marriage Duty to see which apprentices indentured over the previous decade still lived with their masters in 1695. For Bristol we linked the complete published Marriage Duty Assessment listing from 1696 to the population of apprentices indentured in the city from 1686 to 1696. Matching was...
simplified because masters’ wives’ names appear in Bristol’s apprenticeship register. We identified 1,091 apprentice and master pairs in London and 2,230 in Bristol, where linkage was easier. Roughly 60 per cent of the London sample lived within the city walls, broadly in line with the metropolitan population.

The samples include a range of apprentice and master characteristics. We know apprentices’ places of origin, giving us the distance they migrated, and their father’s occupation. We know the size of masters’ households, whether another apprentice was present, and some indication of their wealth (whether or not they had over £600 in personal estate or an income of £50 per annum). For London, we also know whether the apprentice’s father was deceased, if he was a citizen of the city and, if so, his livery company, and whether the master lived within the City walls or outside, where the city’s companies were weaker. Unfortunately, different information about the master’s occupation survives. For London, we only know masters’ companies. Although technically centred on particular crafts, London’s companies included freemen practising a range of occupations. For Bristol, masters’ actual occupations were recorded.

The linking process means our samples do not represent the full variety of apprenticeship situations. In London, we capture only living masters who had been householders for at least three years, biasing our sample towards the more successful and prosperous. Quakers are also excluded, as they generally refused to take the Association Oath. For Bristol, our sample is more comprehensive, but may miss masters who died before 1696. We also make one key assumption: that apprentices in service lived with their masters. This assumption appears to be generally correct for this period. For example, in Bristol lodging elsewhere appears sufficiently unusual that it was recorded specifically for the three indentures where this occurred. Moreover, there is no evidence that lodging varied over apprentices’ terms in a manner that could explain the patterns of absence we found. Absence probably indicates a temporary or permanent break in the direct training relationship between apprentice and master, although, as we will see, apprentices might be away acting as agents for their masters.

A final consideration is that our data are drawn primarily from the 1690s. Our sample of apprentices crosses the Glorious Revolution. Most were indentured in a period of political tension and economic difficulties. The Nine Years War (1688–97) depressed trade and shipping. By 1695 Bristol alone had lost 202 ships to the French. English exports to Spain and the Mediterranean were a quarter of

28 Estimated distance between the county town and London or Bristol.
29 We used E. A. Wrigley’s ‘Primary, Secondary, Tertiary (P.S.T.)’ codes when grouping fathers’ occupations; Wrigley, Poverty, progress, and population, chs. 5 and 11.
31 The Bristol data also identify 60 pauper apprentices, although only 20 can be linked to an identified master. Because of the small numbers, these observations are excluded.
32 This three-year survival bias is the result of linking 1692 and 1695 data to produce our sample. Our Bristol sample does include new masters. There, the time elapsed since a master became a burgess (citizen), a proxy for establishing oneself as a master and householder, did not affect the outcome of apprenticeships. We identified 492 masters in the burgess list, including 80 who became burgesses fewer than three years before taking an apprentice. Among ‘new’ masters, 55.0% of apprentices were present in 1696, compared to 54.4% for ‘older’ masters. Regression estimates of the determinants of retention for apprentices for new and established masters are similar to the results in tab. 5.
33 Further discussion of this assumption is in Wallis, ‘Apprenticeship’, p. 842. For lodging in European apprenticeship more generally, see de Munck and Soly, ‘Learning’, p. 21; Steidl, ‘Silk weaver’, p. 147.
their mid-1680s level. Wartime taxation further pressured manufacturing and trade. Uncertainty around the specie led to a recoinage in 1696 and an economic crisis from shortage of coin. Added to bad harvests, this produced high food prices, peaking in 1698, and lower real wages. Plausibly these conditions influenced selection into apprenticeship. It is less obvious, however, that they would affect decisions to remain in apprenticeship once families had invested time and resources in securing training. We cannot say from our data whether apprenticeship in the 1690s reflects practices earlier or later. That said, rates of entry to mastership appear to be similar to earlier periods, while the institutional system of corporate apprenticeship appears to have functioned much as it had for a century: the strength of English guilds has been debated, but they continued to register apprentices, police the number recruited, and settle disputes between masters and apprentices.

II

Legally, apprentices’ service began when they signed their indenture and took their oath. Once indentured, apprentices were legally tied to a master for the term specified in the contract. The reality of English apprenticeship appears less settled, however. Figure 1 gives rolling 10-month averages for the proportion of apprentices present in their masters’ households in London and Bristol during their terms. Each observation month represents the behaviour of a different cohort of apprentices. For example, for London the first month of year five shows the proportion of apprentices bound in May 1690 who were still present in May 1695. Two caveats need to be emphasized. First, as snapshots, they say nothing about changes in the composition of the stock of apprentices over time. Second, three types of absence may underlie our calculations: some apprentices were away temporarily, others had left permanently, and some might never have actually resided with their master, despite their indentures. The rolling averages will be lower than the actual proportion of apprentices present at some stage in their terms, as a single cross-section cannot distinguish between different types of absence.

In both London and Bristol we find clear patterns of staged decline over apprentices’ terms. Many apprentices left their original masters’ households before their contract was completed. Most departed in the first half of their term. In London, the proportion of apprentices present peaked between the sixth and twenty-fourth month of service. It then declined sharply to a trough in year four. After small fluctuations, the final decline comes at the end of the sixth year. The

34 Jones, War and economy, pp. 130–1, 159; Rose, England, pp. 126–8.
35 Brewer, Sinews, pp. 89, 95–100, 114.
39 In London, company registration usually occurred the same day as binding. Of 72 surviving indentures, 67 bear the same date as their registration, three differed by one day, one by four days, and one by three months; LMA, COL/CHD/FR/02. In Bristol, indentures were sealed at the city’s Tolzey Court.
two falls at the end of years seven and eight reflect the mix of terms in our sample. Bristol’s patterns are broadly similar, although slightly more compressed than London’s.40

While the dominant impression of figure 1 is the decline in presence over time, it is also clear that the start of apprenticeship was not clear-cut. Some apprentices prefaced service with a trial period.41 As table 1 shows, trials were common in London, where 42 per cent of apprentices were present in the six months before they were bound; less so in Bristol, where 6 per cent of apprentices were present early. The smaller size of the city and its recruitment market may help explain this. No trials exceeded six months.

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40 Bristol apprenticeships were for seven years, with three exceptions in this period bound for eight years.
41 Dunlop and Denman, *English apprenticeship*, p. 162.
The slow arrival of many other apprentices is also striking. Apprentices’ training apparently often began much later than the start of their indentures. In London, only around two-thirds of apprentices were present in their first year, with the proportion rising from 61 per cent in the first six months to 70 per cent in the second (table 1). In Bristol the lag was even more pronounced: the proportion of apprentices present exceeded 50 per cent only a year after service technically began. This was not because young apprentices remained at home while working.42 A few may have been away at school.43 For many, the legal and effective dates of contracts apparently differed: these apprentices took their oaths and then left again, joining their masters months or years later. Consequently, if they completed, most apprentices’ actual period of service was substantially shorter than the statutory minimum.

Behind these aggregate patterns of apprenticeship lies considerable variation among different groups and trades that is not captured in formal rules or standard accounts of service. One aspect is a subtle difference between local and migrant apprentices. In London, migrants’ earlier arrival often translated into slightly longer effective terms, as they left around the same time as London-born apprentices (figure 2). In Bristol (figure 3) locals’ effective terms were longer than migrants, who were absent particularly toward the end of their terms.44 This probably reflects differences between apprentices in the two cities, particularly the

Figure 2. London apprentice persistence, migrants and locals
Sources: See text for details of sample construction.

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42 If this occurred, we would expect more migrants to be present in year one. This was not the case.
43 Ben-Amos, Adolescence, pp. 112, 173; Guildhall Library, London (hereafter GL), MS 5257/5, fo. 131.
44 For both London and Bristol, we estimated regressions of apprentice presence against dummy variables for year of binding, and interaction terms between year of binding and migrant status. For Bristol, four of the eight interaction terms are statistically significant at the 5% level, with migrants less likely to be present at both the beginning and end of the specified term. No interaction terms are significant in London’s smaller sample, though several indicate large marginal effects in the order of 7 to 11 percentage points.
higher bar to departure created by the longer distances migrant apprentices travelled to London, and the relative appeal of opportunities elsewhere compared to those in expanding London or provincial Bristol. The most striking differences in apprenticeship were between occupations. This is most visible for Bristol, where we know the master’s occupation (figure 4). The most dramatic divergence from the city average, presented in figure 1, was among merchant and seafaring apprentices (figure 4a) who might travel on behalf of their master. Merchants’ apprentices’ work as an overseas factor was often the foundation of their later independent trading. Service abroad could be determined formally. For example, the indenture for seafarer apprentice Thomas Garrard specified that ‘at the end of three years [he was] to go to sea’. Nevertheless, that these apprentices were absent for much of their service period was unexpected.

Service in other trades more closely resembled the city average, but the occupational breakdown does usefully highlight two characteristics of apprenticeship. Firstly, most trades showed a distinctive decline in the second half of apprentices’ terms, followed by a resurgence in the year or so before completion that may be due to apprentices returning to regularize their service and allow their masters convincingly to present them as having completed their terms (figure 4b–e). Secondly, the differences between local and migrant apprentices varied between trades, a pattern clearest in general manufacturing trades which were practised

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45 The average apprentice migration to London was 134 miles, compared to 44 miles to Bristol.
47 The resurgence does not appear to be a cohort effect, due to demographic or economic factors. The timing of the bump is similar in London and Bristol though the observation points differ by a year. Secondly, the difference between local and migrant resurgence suggests that endogenous rather than exogenous factors drive that pattern.
Figure 4. Bristol apprenticeship persistence, selected trades

Sources: See text for details of sample construction.
widely beyond the city. Local-born apprentices in these trades usually returned and completed: 63 per cent were present in years six and seven, versus 50 per cent in years four and five. Among migrants, presence declined in their last two years: only 54 per cent were present in years six and seven, against 77 per cent in years four and five.

For London, we can subdivide apprentices only by company. Even this reveals striking differences that echo Bristol. As figures 5a and b show, the proportion of apprentices present with their masters in the larger, less cohesive, and more mercantile companies of the Great Twelve falls more dramatically over their terms than in the smaller, more homogenous lesser companies. The rise in presence at the end of the term is also more marked outside the Great Twelve, suggesting greater concern with regulations. Although the Great Twelve were relatively rich and powerful, their size and occupationally varied membership made monitoring

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48 This group consists of apprentices in the following trades: cordwainer, weaver, blacksmith, pewterer, currier, serge-weaver, clothworker, pinmaker, silkweaver, brazier, serge-maker, carpenter, Glover, turner, smith, culter, dyer, and basketmaker.

49 We do not illustrate the migrant/local split in fig. 4; the number of observations in each rolling interval are small.
apprenticeship and employment difficult. Our data are most abundant for two London companies: the Vintners (figure 5c), which was one of the Great Twelve, and the Apothecaries (figure 5d), which was not. They show divergent patterns, probably reflecting institutional abilities and the characteristics of each occupation. Apothecaries showed high return rates at the end of their terms; it was a relatively well-regulated, highly skilled, and homogenous company, whose members tended to run small shops. Vintners’ apprentices, by contrast, present a strong downward trend in the proportion present; their masters typically recruited many apprentices, presumably anticipating high dropout rates, and employment in taverns and the wine trade demanded less skill and more staff.50

One point where the rules of apprenticeship did work as specified was at the end of the term. For those who got there, completion precipitated a firm break. Few apprentices remained in residence with their masters after their seventh year. Migrant apprentices in London left a little more slowly: a quarter remained with their masters in their ninth year. However, their departure was deferred only temporarily. Compared to better connected locals, migrants may have relied more on their masters for an initial opportunity as a journeyman. They may also have been making up time lost through earlier absences: travel time would have multiplied the impact of temporary departures for sickness, family, or holiday. In general, apprenticeship did not lead into an ongoing employment relationship.51 Consequently, few of the reasons that are sometimes proposed to explain why modern companies take apprentices, such as information about employees’ skills, or why apprentices remain in service, such as higher earnings after completion, could apply in this context.52

On the whole, apprentices more often trimmed months off their contracts than extended them. Laggards at the start of service, they departed precipitously at the end; the proportion present fell from the beginning of their seventh year, if not earlier. Guild records occasionally contain agreements for early completion, sometimes in exchange for a gift or fee.53 However, a larger proportion of apprentices were absent during their final months of service than official records would indicate. This suggests contemporaries considered a satisfactory level of training was often achievable in fewer than seven years. Youths’ time could be better spent elsewhere, perhaps at school, while they were technically fulfilling their term requirements, much as midshipmen in the English navy were entered on to ships’ books to acquire notional sea time in the eighteenth century.54 Shortened terms do not imply that apprenticeship was not training, however. Most continental European apprenticeships lasted under seven years. By trimming their terms, English youths brought their experiences closer to those of their continental peers.55

50 Wallis, ‘Medicines’, p. 146. Between 1600 and 1750, London vintners who took any apprentices trained an average of 4.7 over their career.
52 Acemoglu and Pischke, ‘Beyond Becker’; Smits and Stromback, Economics.
53 LMA, COL/CA/05/02, s.v. Baron (1690); Batty (n.d.); Chase (c. 1688); Corbett (c. 1670).
54 We owe this comparison to one of the referees.
55 Evidence from Vienna suggests that effective terms in that city were also shorter than prescribed by law; Steidl, ‘Silk weaver’, pp. 143–5.
What had happened to the one in two apprentices who were missing from their masters? There are several possible explanations for apprentices’ absences. Perhaps 10 per cent of apprentices died during their term: migration into cities carried health risks. Some apprentices left their trade, were ejected for disorder, crime, marrying, or some other breach of their indentures, or were abandoned by their masters. A few apprentices even conspired with their masters to evade the rules. For example, in 1711 Thomas Blee was accused of being ‘turned over to . . . a Carrman under colour of Service but never actually served him as an apprentice but hath ever since acted as a Porter’. The remainder continued to train or work in the same trade. Among these apprentices were some who had permanently left their master, either legally or illicitly, while others worked elsewhere on his behalf. Runaways tend to dominate the surviving sources—which are largely from legal disputes—but departures could benefit both apprentices and masters. If mutually agreed, departure normally occurred without any external record.

Legitimately mobile apprentices do appear occasionally in court records and apprentice autobiographies, revealing some of the reasons behind absences. As an apprentice, Phineas Pett assisted two shipwrights in addition to his own master. Both Roger Lowe and William Stout finished their training as grocers running separate shops for their masters. We find masters hiring out their apprentices for wages. Apprentices also left their masters to gain new skills. The apprentice surgeon George Benson, for example, was permitted ‘travell for his better experience in his profession’, having paid his master a fee to compensate him for his absence.

Formally, apprentices who sought permanently to leave their original masters while continuing their apprenticeship had to be ‘turned over’ to another master in the same craft. These transfers were not uncommon. Among London apothecaries in the seventeenth century, for example, 17 per cent of apprentices were turned over to another master. Turning over was often a response to events undermining the original agreement, including the death, sickness, bankruptcy, or retirement of the master. It was occasionally, and inconsistently, recorded in company or civic records. However, many, probably most, turnovers were not recorded officially. Apprentices might experience both formal and informal turning over,

56 Schwarz, ‘London apprentices’.
58 LMA, COL/CA/05/02, A–C, 22 Jan. 1711. See also ibid., s.v. Clarke (n.d.). Numerous contemporary complaints exist about this practice; GL, MS 5257/3, fo. 39; 5257/5, fo. 239; LMA, Repertories of the Court of Aldermen, 61/258b, 63/171, 63/373, 64/73, 66/209, 66/291; BRO, JTOL/J/2/1, pp. 497–6, 470, 439, 506, 504; BRO, MS 08018, p. 27; McGrath, ed., Records, pp. 38, 40, 49; Pelling, Common lot, pp. 212–13.
59 Although journeymen technically should have completed their training, prosecutions of artisans for non-completion generally focused on independent masters; Davies, Enforcement, pp. 263–4.
60 Ben-Amos, ‘Failure’, p. 167.
61 Ben-Amos, Adolescence, p. 114.
63 Ben-Amos, Adolescence, pp. 127–8; BRO, MS 08018, Ordinances for City Companies, f. 56; Bird, Laws, pp. 35–6; GL, MS 5257/5, fo. 170; Gregg and Boswell, eds., Records, pp. 61–2.
64 GL, MS 5257/3, fo. 45. See also GL, MS 5257/4, fo. 41; Hobson, Memoirs, pp. 12–13.

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complicating the picture. For example, Thomas Gibbs, a London baker’s apprentice, served a different master for the first six years of his term ‘but was not turn’d over to him according to the Custome’. However, he was then ‘turn’d over before the Chamberlain to Joseph Golding of the same Company & Trade with whom he completed the terme’. Among our London sample, 27 (2.5 per cent) were officially turned over; in Bristol the total was 54 (2.5 per cent). These are implausibly low rates, probably due to the limits of the records; although our samples do necessarily exclude most cases where a move would have been forced by death or disruption of business.

To what extent were apprentices turned over to masters in the same city? In an attempt to achieve a better estimate of the importance of this reason for absence in London, we identified which servants or lodgers living with masters in our sample had been indentured to another master in the same company during the previous seven years. We identified 65 probable apprentices, some of whom might have been only temporarily absent from their original masters. Our sample of masters took 916 apprentices in the seven years before the tax listing was made (of whom 455 were present in 1695). This suggests that a minimum of 7 per cent of apprentices moved to other local, and legitimate, masters. In Bristol, we searched for the 619 apprentices indentured in the seven years to 1696 who were not with their original master. We found 28 living with householders who shared their original masters’ occupations. This gives a lower rate of internal mobility than London (2 per cent), but the tighter constraints in linkage mean this is probably an underestimate. For Bristol, where the smaller population renders nominal linkage feasible, we also looked for absent apprentices in other city households. To reduce the effect of bad matches, we searched for two groups: coopers’ and soapmakers’ apprentices—both likely to return to their master—and a general group of unusually named apprentices. Of 33 absent coopers’ and soapmakers’ apprentices, two were with their parents and nine may have been servants in other households, although several of these had common names. Of the 24 absent apprentices with unusual names, two were ‘servants’ in other households, two were with their parents, and one had married and established an independent household. It is unclear if we can generalize from this. Nonetheless, these rough figures suggest that movement to another master in the same trade and city might account for around 10 per cent of apprentices absent in 1695. Such local legitimate circulation is unlikely to explain most absences. It seems that many absent apprentices were either away from the city, or now worked outside the corporate system.

66 LMA, COL/CA/05/02, D-K, s.v. Gibbs (c. 1718).
67 In Bristol 53 apprentices (22 of whom were present) were bound to masters who died before 1696 and whose widows maintained their household.
68 The linkage was restricted to apprentices bound from 1688 to 1695, who were not found with their own master, and who did not possess a common name (for example, John Smith, Thomas Powell). The 65 people matched to apprentices were with 46 different masters. Our initial linkage was on forename and surname using double metaphone, followed by manual checking.
69 Occupational information in Bristol is relatively precise compared to company-level information for London. This leads to the exclusion of links where apprentices may have worked in cognate trades (such as blockmaker and shipwright) or masters pursued multiple occupations.
70 This is also a further argument against explaining persistence rates by lodging out.
71 Unusual names were those occurring fewer than six times among the 356,000 people named in marriage licenses from the Vicar-General of the Archbishopric of Canterbury between 1694 and 1800; Society of Genealogists, ‘Vicar Generals’ marriage licence index’.
72 For three apprentices, there was more than one possible nominal linkage.
The implications of apprentices’ high rates of absence can also be examined through the effects of departure on their subsequent corporate careers. Apprenticeship was the major basis on which young men became freemen and burgesses, as citizens were termed in London and Bristol, respectively. Citizens’ privileges—particularly the right to trade independently and the right to vote—were the key benefit from completion. Data are patchy for London and better for Bristol. In both cities, masters had to swear that their apprentice had served his full indenture ‘after the manner of an Apprentice’ before he could be freed; the penalty for dishonesty was disenfranchisement for both. Freedom rates thus offer an indication of the extent to which absence indicated a breakdown of service and training.

In both London and Bristol, about 40 per cent of apprentices later became citizens. Local apprentices were somewhat more likely to become citizens than migrants, reflecting the cities’ roles as training centres and the advantages of local resources in establishing a business. Most apprentices who later became citizens remained with their masters. However, a substantial minority of future citizens—33 per cent in London and 28 per cent in Bristol—were absent. The proportion of future citizens present declined over their term of service in London, falling from an average of 74 per cent present between six months and three years to an average of 63 per cent present in years four to six, although not in Bristol. Indeed, more than a quarter of absent apprentices would later become citizens. For both cities, these rates of absence among apprentices who later became citizens substantially exceed our admittedly rough estimates for movement within a trade and city. Together with the evidence discussed earlier of apprentices returning to their masters towards the end of their terms, this underlines the importance of temporary departures from their masters and probably their cities in the experiences of apprentices.

Even among those apprentices who remained with their masters, service was not a direct route into the citizenry, particularly in London. A substantial minority of apprentices who were present with their masters in the final year of their contracts

73 For London, we use freedom records for 18 companies with 674 apprentices in our sample: the Masons, Clockmakers, Curriers, Tylers, Carmans, Ironmongers, Blacksmiths, Painters, Fishmongers, Distillers, Stationers, Apothecaries, Butchers, Turners, Vintners, Innholders, Cooks, and Grocers. For Bristol, see Bristol & Avon Family History Society, Bristol burgess books.

74 For certification, see LMA, COL/CHD/FR/12/048, s.v. Cheale (1766). Disenfranchisement was enforced; see, for example, LMA, Repertories, vs. 70, fo. 19b; vs. 87, fos. 199b, 206b, 210; vs. 91, fo. 98; vs. 92, fos. 103, 215; LMA, COL CHD/FR/12/048, s.v. Ansley (1720). Some disenfranchisement cases, including untrue declarations by masters, are indexed at LMA, COL/CHD/FR/12/005.

75 London, 40%; Bristol, 46%. To reduce the impact of late arrivals on the figures, we refer here to the proportion of apprentices present from six months after indenturing to seven years. A test of means comparing the differences between London and Bristol yields a t-statistic of −1.1, well short of conventional levels of statistical significance. Detailed statistics on freedom rates by year of service can be found in Minns and Wallis, ‘Rules and reality’ (see above, n. 25), tabs. 2 and 3, pp. 44–5.

76 Local versus migrant rates are 43% to 38% in London and 45% to 41% in Bristol. The t-statistic on a test of means for differences between migrants and locals is 1.0 for London, and 1.6 for Bristol. The second suggests a difference close to statistical significance at the 5% level.

77 The proportion of apprentices later freed who were present in 1695 was 67% in London and 72% in Bristol. Both city differences have high levels of statistical significance, with t-statistics above 7.

78 The proportions of absent apprentices later freed are London, 25%; Bristol, 31%.

79 Cf. Farr, Artisans, p. 34.
did not become citizens. In London, 26 per cent of apprentices present in year seven of their term never became citizens. In Bristol, the figure was 36 per cent. Although the exigencies of life could intervene in the plans of the most ambitious apprentice, it is hard to know if those who completed but never became citizens should be seen as failures, given that migration was an option and journeymen prospered in some trades.

As we have seen, apprenticeship varied between cities, between trades, and between locals and migrants. Evidence of turning over and citizenship rates reveal the importance of temporary movements within and beyond the city. But many departures appear to have been permanent. To explore why some apprentices remained with their masters while others did not, we have estimated probit regression models of apprentice persistence (tables 2 and 3). Our sources include information on the wealth, personal connections, and household characteristics of masters and apprentices, all of which may have affected completion.

Our data indicate whether apprentices were resident with their master on one particular day; this provides the dependent variable. The regression is estimated for those observations where we have information about the full set of apprentice and master characteristics: almost 700 observations for London and over 1,300 for Bristol. Summary statistics for the characteristics underlying the regression analysis are provided in appendix tables A1 and A2. It is important to emphasize that absence may indicate either permanent or temporary departure,
which our sources do not distinguish. We can partially address this shortcoming by including year dummies to control for changes in presence rates due to unmeasured factors causing temporary absences, and by controlling for the occupational and institutional differences that are likely to have determined patterns of temporary absence. In tables 2 and 3, we present estimates for three groups: all (column 1), local (column 2), and migrant (column 3) apprentices. Regression coefficients have been transformed into marginal effects. Some care should be exercised when comparing the two tables. In particular, the Bristol sample contains greater occupational detail than London, and some of the most interesting variables are recorded only for one city. We do not present estimates of pooled regressions due to the small number of common variables for the two cities. However, in a pooled sample, coefficients on common variables are broadly similar in the two cities; a statistically significant difference was found only for distance.80

The results confirm our earlier observations about occupational variation and differences according to apprentices’ origins. Divergence between occupations is

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80 Results available on request.
clearest in Bristol, where the evidence is better. There, apprentices in manufacturing occupations, particularly coopering and carpentry, were most likely to be present. For London our data are weaker, but we do find a general difference between apprentices in London’s Great Twelve companies and the rest. Apprenticeship also clearly varied in duration for locals and migrants. Migrant apprentices in London were 11 percentage points more likely to be present. In Bristol, by contrast, the pattern is reversed. These findings reinforce the patterns observed in figures 2 and 3; as noted earlier, we suspect the cities’ variance reflects different migration pools, the scale of opportunities, and how apprentices were selected to the metropolis.

The real value of the regressions is in revealing additional reasons for absence among apprentices. They suggest that many absent apprentices had left because their prospects were better elsewhere, while those who remained often possessed local connections that improved their prospects in the city. The most compelling indication of this comes from data on whether Bristol masters and their apprentices’ parents shared an occupation (table 3). The coefficient on this variable is positive and statistically significant in the full sample and among local apprentices (columns 1 and 2), but negative and insignificant among migrants (column 3). It seems plausible that a completed term was more valuable for those with local connections, while migrants were pulled away by external familial networks to which the benefits of Bristol training and connections were complementary.

In London, the size, quality, and location of apprentices’ networks and family resources also affected completion. Citizens’ sons were significantly more likely to be present. Migrant apprentices with fathers in distribution and sales occupations, where familial wealth and commercial connections were localized, were significantly more likely to be absent, while the opposite was true for locals.81 We can also see the effect of institutional factors at work here: those with connections inside guilds, such as citizens’ sons, had greater incentives to achieve membership; persistence was significantly lower among those entering a Great Twelve company than one of the smaller, more homogenous companies (column 1 and 3), while those whose masters lived within the City walls where corporate controls were stronger were more persistent (column 1 and 3).

The results also suggest that masters’ volume of work, indicated by household size, and their levels of success, indicated by wealth, also shaped apprentice outcomes.82 In London, migrant apprentices in large households (with seven or more non-apprentices in residence) were less likely to be present. Conversely, migrants matched to wealthy masters were more likely to persist, perhaps indicating the increased value of commercial connections obtained from those successful masters. These differences suggest that the quality of connections and

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81 Although the coefficient is not statistically significant, the behaviour of sons of gentlemen points to similar conclusions. Bristol shows a similar pattern for distribution and sales.

82 In supplementary regressions (not included here), we decomposed household size into kin and non-kin components. It is impossible to do this perfectly for every household—there are unidentified kin apprentices in some (especially in Bristol) who are outside our sample. In these regressions the presence of non-kin household members is negatively related to apprentice persistence. This may suggest that apprentices were less attached in households with more workers, perhaps because masters with more employees could offer less time to each apprentice. Alternatively, non-kin household members may have replaced departed apprentices, which would also generate a negative coefficient.
opportunities a master could provide was more important for migrants; London-born apprentices relied less on their masters for networks.

VI

Our findings suggest that the institution of apprenticeship was much more fluid than is traditionally understood. English apprenticeship was not ‘inflexible’.83 As we have seen, in London and Bristol apprentices frequently started late, often left temporarily or permanently after serving only part of their term, and generally finished early. Many apprentices’ terms consisted of a few years in residence followed by a period elsewhere, akin to work as a journeymen. While apprenticed, they experienced significant mobility and were probably exposed to different workshops. In this, English apprenticeship resembled training in some other parts of Europe which normally involved shorter terms followed by several years as a journeymen.84

Despite the generic norms of the Statute of Artificers, English apprenticeship was also shaped by occupational and individual circumstances. The likelihood that apprentices remained with their masters differed substantially between trades and companies. The behaviour of locals and migrants, and those with and without local connections, varied in ways that suggest that apprenticeship was adapted to the individual and their resources. We do not know whether early departures represented opportunistic behaviour, or if they were negotiated. Given the ubiquity of absences, however, most presumably were consensual. Whether a common apprentice culture could bridge such different experiences remains an open question, but such a range of forms of service surely confirms Griffiths’s account of a ‘multitude of particular worlds’ among apprentices.85

Apprentices’ high rates of departure suggest many saw completion and mastership as only one possible outcome of apprenticeship. The behaviour of migrant apprentices, in particular, shows how some youths circulated through cities to obtain skills and connections. Apprenticeship was an integral part of a wider, national training market. That youths started and left service in large numbers—often leaving after a period that equated in some continental settings to a full term—suggests apprenticeship was understood as an effective way to acquire skills and training, while the appeal of the institutional, social, and cultural privileges derived from completion varied.

Given these findings, formal institutions appear to have contributed little to regulating apprenticeship and creating human capital. In London and Bristol, the terms of service specified in indentures and statute law were breached despite guild supervision; these contracts were not self-enforcing as written.86 Apprenticeship thrived, however, when measured by the numbers of entrants. Flexible apprenticeship might come at a cost, however. As Wallis suggests, masters could

83 Cf. Lane, Apprenticeship, p. 2.
85 Griffiths, Youth, p. 165.
not assume they would recover any training costs in the latter part of an apprentice’s term, as standard models of the economics of apprenticeship anticipate, leading to a different, and perhaps less efficient, training structure.\footnote{Wallis, ‘Apprenticeship’, pp. 845–91.} Apprentices might still suffer reputational damage if departure were ill managed.\footnote{Subsequent earnings may have reflected this; Humphries, ‘Rent seeking’ (see above, n. 10), pp. 7–8.} Against this, we must set the potentially high costs of strictly enforced contracts that cannot be adapted to circumstances.

While the rules of apprenticeship were not observed exactly, they still mattered. The formal completion of indentures remained a concern for a substantial proportion of apprentices, including a number who would not become citizens, alongside those with strong local ties. For those who reached the close of their term, apprenticeships generally ended when they should; others tailored their movements to return to their master for their final years. The persistence of advanced apprentices, whose masters had presumably recovered their training expenses, suggests that the reputational and legal benefits of completion remained valuable: these apprentices supplied their masters with rents as trainees in anticipation of the rents they would receive from citizenship in the future. This may explain why the formal terms of apprenticeship survived despite the divergences we observe. Apprenticeship was more fluid than is usually thought, but England’s urban economy continued to be shaped by the corporate structures of guilds and the requirements of the Statute of Artificers.

Apprenticeship in England was not the uniform and rigid institution sometimes imagined, vigorously policed by society and guilds. Rather it was an amalgam of informal norms developed around inflexible formal benchmarks. The evidence of internal and external mobility within apprenticeship suggests the existence of a market for training and apprentice-level labour in which apprentices and masters engaged in numerous ways. It remains to be seen whether apprenticeship elsewhere in Europe, or in smaller communities in England, operated similarly. English apprenticeship required an unusually long term, but counterbalanced this with significant legal privileges.\footnote{For English rules, see n. 2 above. On terms elsewhere, see Reith, ‘Apprentices’, pp. 182–3; Steidl, ‘Silk weaver’, p. 142; de Munck, \textit{Technologies}, pp. 59–68; Stabel, ‘Social mobility’, pp. 161–2.} Elsewhere in Europe, prescribed periods of service varied more between individuals, trades, and cities.\footnote{For Flanders, see Stabel, ‘Guilds’, pp. 203–5; idem, ‘Social mobility’, p. 175. For the Netherlands, see Davids, ‘Apprenticeship’, p. 78. For Vienna, see Steidl, ‘Silk weaver’, p. 151. Not all corporate systems shared this characteristic; Ogilvie, ‘Guilds, efficiency, and social capital’, pp. 307–13. For completion rates, see n. 13 above.} Yet completion rates in some regions were as low as those we observe, and several recent studies have emphasized the ‘flexibility’ of training and the ‘limited hold’ of the guilds on apprenticeship.\footnote{In this vein, both Clark, ‘Condition’, p. 1316, and van Zanden, ‘Skill premium’, p. 147, note that guilds do not appear to have been inflating wages.} Indeed, to the extent that western Europe’s relatively low skill premium after the Black Death was the result of its apprenticeship system, it seems plausible that it was the weakness and lassitude, not the strength, of the institutions supervising training that mattered.\footnote{For England, see n. 2 above. On terms elsewhere, see Reith, ‘Apprentices’, pp. 182–3; Steidl, ‘Silk weaver’, p. 142; de Munck, \textit{Technologies}, pp. 59–68; Stabel, ‘Social mobility’, pp. 161–2.}
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APPENDIX TABLE A1: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR LONDON SAMPLE OF APPRENTICES, 1687–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) All</th>
<th>(2) London or Middlesex origin</th>
<th>(3) Migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present in May 1695 (%)</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent deceased (%)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent citizen of London (%)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent gentleman (%)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent yeoman (%)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent husbandman (%)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent other agriculture (%)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent craft (%)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent distribution and sales (%)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent service (%)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent other professional (%)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent labourer (%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Great Twelve company (%)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master household of seven or more (%)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master rich (%)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master inside city walls (%)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>413</td>
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</tbody>
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Notes: See text for details of sample construction. The sample consists of apprentices bound in London between May 1687 and April 1695.
## APPENDIX TABLE A2: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR BRISTOL REGRESSION SAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>(1) All</th>
<th>(2) Bristol</th>
<th>(3) Migrants</th>
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<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrant (%)</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parent gentleman (%)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parent yeoman (%)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent husbandman (%)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent other agriculture (%)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent craft (%)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent distribution and sales (%)</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent service (%)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent other professional (%)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent labourer (%)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master barber (%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master joiner (%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master carpenter (%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master merchant tailor (%)</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master baker (%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master cooper (%)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master grocer (%)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master merchant (%)</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master soapmaker (%)</td>
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<td>Master weaver (%)</td>
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<td>Master seafaring trade (%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Master household of seven or more (%)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master rich (%)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master same occupation as parent (%)</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>695</td>
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</table>

**Notes:** See text for details of sample construction. The sample consists of apprentices bound in Bristol between Sept. 1688 and Aug. 1696.